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I. INTRODUCTION
The Tennessee Supreme Court, elected simultaneously for the
first time since the early 1900's, assumed office in September 1974
amid speculation concerning future judicial policy. The court, com-
posed of Chief Justice William H. D. Fones and Justices Ray L.
Brock, Jr., Robert E. Cooper, William J. Harbison, and Joe W.
Henry, immediately indicated the importance of a uniform judicial
policy governing criminal procedure by creating a special commis-
sion to revise the state rules of criminal procedure. Additionally,
during its present term the court has decided numerous cases di-
rected toward the formation of well-defined rules under which crim-
inal allegations can be adjudged.
This Special Project will examine the supreme court's criminal
procedure opinions, focusing specifically on the following areas: jury
selection, right to counsel, scope of discovery, admissibility of evi-
dence, limitations on proper prosecutorial argument to the jury, jury
instructions, sentencing procedures, and expungement of criminal
records.' The Tennessee position will be compared with the policies
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, the federal circuit
courts, and various uniform acts and standards proposed by legisla-
tive advisory groups. Although this Project does not attempt to
extract any singular theme underlying the decisions discussed, its
analysis should assist in understanding the court's present judicial
guidelines in the field of criminal procedure and should indicate the
policies that the court will adhere to in future criminal decisions.
II. JURY SELECTION: THE REASONABLE CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial requires selection of both grand and
petit juries2 from a representative cross section of the community.3
The cross section requirement ensures juries' impartiality by pre-
venting the domination by or exclusion of any special group from
1. This Special Project will examine only those opinions published by March 1, 1977.
2. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Sims
v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 129 (1964).
3. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See also
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), in which the Court ruled that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial is binding on the states by virtue of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court, in challenges to jury selection procedure, considered whether the systematic
exclusion of segments of the population from juries violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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the jury selection process.4 Thus the Court determined that the pool
from which a jury is chosen must represent fairly the distinctive
groups within the community.5
Responding to the constitutional requirement of impartial jury
selection procedures, state legislatures and courts have sought guid-
ance from the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 and
the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act (Uniform Act).7 Both
acts contain a provision forbidding discrimination in jury selection
procedures" and envision the random selection of jurors from objec-
tively compiled master jury rolls.' Under the Federal Act, master
jury roles are composed by the mechanical selection of names from
lists of registered or actual voters within a judicial district.'" This
procedure, designed to eliminate subjective criteria for compiling
master jury roles, focuses solely on the criteria of residency." The
Uniform Act, adopted in whole or in part by eleven states," supple-
ments voter registration rolls with one or several other equally objec-
tive lists.' 3 Moreover, the Act adopts language that imposes the
obligation of jury service on all qualified citizens,'4 thereby effec-
4. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 495 (1972).
5. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1865 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Jury
Selection Act]. For an excellent discussion of the Federal Jury Selection Act, see Daughtrey,
Cross Sectionalism in Juy-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TEN. L. Ray.
1, 85-94 (1975).
7. The Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act was approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and by the American Bar Association
in 1972.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) provides that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded
from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States on account of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."
9. In adopting a declaration of policy, § 1 of the Uniform Act acknowledges reliance on
the comparable section of the Federal Jury Selection Act. UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND
SERvIcE ACT § 1, Comment.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) provides in part:
These procedures shall be designed to ensure the random selection of a fair cross section
of the persons residing in the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.
(emphasis added)
12. California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington.
13. UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT § 5, Comment. Section 5 provides that
actual and registered voter lists should be supplemented by lists reflecting actual residents
such as utility customers, property and income taxpayers, motor vehicle registrants, and
persons with drivers' licenses. The Comment indicates that the commission recommended
these supplementary criteria for compiling the master rolls because the exclusive use of voter
lists might have a chilling effect upon exercise of the right to vote.
14. UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT § 2.
1977]
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tively proscribing statutes adopted in several states that allow spe-
cific segments of society to avoid jury service by merely requesting
the elimination of their names from jury duty without providing any
reasonable grounds for disqualification.' 5
In contrast to the Federal and the Uniform Act, Tennessee has
disparate procedures that retain subjective criteria for compiling
jury rolls.' 6 The principal selection procedures, found in section 22-
228 of the Tennessee Code,1 7 place responsibility for compiling mas-
ter jury rolls in the board of jury commissioners for a judicial dis-
trict, who are directed to choose "upright and intelligent persons
known for their integrity, fair character and sound judgment" from
tax, voter registration, and other reliable records.'8 These proce-
dures, however, do not apply to the state's four largest urban
areas-Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, and Shelby counties. Each of
these districts is governed by private acts, which contain language
similar to that found in the statewide enactment.'9 In Davidson
County, however, an alternative provision allows the criminal court
judge or board of jury commissioners to direct compilation of jury
venires at random by mechanical tabulation of voter registration
rolls, thereby eliminating subjective selection criteria."0 The objec-
15. Such procedures generally are employed to allow women to reject unconditionally
the obligation of jury duty.
16. For a discussion of the various jury selection procedures in Tennessee, see Daugh-
trey, supra note 6, at 94-99.
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-228 (Supp. 1976).
18. Id.
19. The applicable private act legislation follows: Davidson County: 1947 Tenn. Priv.
Acts 153, ch. 53, as amended by 1947 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1967, ch. 497; 1947 Tenn. Priv. Acts
1968, ch. 498; 1949 Tenn. Priv. Acts 953, ch. 358; 1951 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1647, ch. 550; 1963
Tenn. Priv. Acts 519, ch. 167; 1965 Tenn. Priv. Acts 392, ch. 105; 1967 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1234,
ch. 329; 1972 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1247, ch. 322; 1975 Tenn. Priv. Acts 327, ch. 85; Hamilton
County: 1931 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1516, ch. 564, as amended by 1937 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1059, ch.
347; 1951 Tenn. Priv. Acts 778, ch. 294; 1953 Tenn. Priv. Acts 901, ch. 276; 1963 Tenn. Priv.
Acts 754, ch. 238; 1967 Tenn. Priv. Acts 347, ch. 90; 1971 Tenn. Priv. Acts 208, ch. 55; Knox
County: 1965 Tenn. Priv. Acts 554, ch. 159, as amended by 1969 Tenn. Priv. Acts 510, ch.
128; 1970 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1197, ch. 321; 1971 Tenn. Priv. Acts 706, ch. 170; 1973 Tenn. Priv.
Acts 452, ch. 134; Shelby County: 1905 Tenn. Priv. Acts 472, ch. 230, as amended by 1907
Tenn. Priv. Acts 831, ch. 226; 1907 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1930, ch. 561; 1911 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1939,
ch. 640; 1923 Tenn. Priv. Acts 772, ch. 247; 1923 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1606, ch. 418; 1929 Tenn.
Priv. Acts 1759, ch. 633; 1929 Tenn. Priv. Acts 2415, ch. 818; 1931 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1189, ch.
447; 1933 Tenn. Priv. Acts 898, ch. 370; 1933 Tenn. Priv. Acts 1167, ch. 370; 1937 Tenn. Priv.
Acts 1167, ch. 378; 1949 Tenn. Priv. Acts 635, ch. 236; 1951 Tenn. Priv. Acts 440, ch. 157;
1953 Tenn. Priv. Acts 943, ch. 298; 1955 Tenn. Priv. Acts 334, ch. 118; 1961 Tenn. Priv. Acts
437, ch. 121; 1969 Tenn. Priv. Acts 755, ch. 182; 1970 Tenn. Priv. Acts 755, ch. 316; 1970 Tenn.
Priv. Acts 1180, ch. 316.
20. One commentator has suggested that this alternative provision, enacted under 1967
Tenn. Priv. Acts 1234, ch. 329, § 1, provides the only objective criteria for jury selection in
Tennessee. See Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 97-98.
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tivity offered by this alternative provision is undermined by a state-
wide provision that allows any woman to exempt herself from jury
duty merely by notifying the court officer that she would like to be
excused.2
In State v. Jefferson,2 the Tennessee Supreme Court consid-
ered the Tennessee jury selection procedures in light of the constitu-
tional mandate that the state must assure that a reasonable cross
section of the community will be represented on jury rolls. Challeng-
ing the Davidson County selection procedure,23 the defendant al-
leged that the process used to prepare jury rolls systematically ex-
cluded large segments of the black population and unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against women in their service on the
county's juries.24 In a brief opinion 21 the court remanded defendant's
allegations of racial imbalance for a lower court hearing and sum-
marily dismissed consideration of unconstitutional discrimination
against the selection of women.2 1
For several reasons, the court's first brush with the cross section
requirement was a disappointing one. By focusing on past Tennes-
see decisions upholding the constitutionality of the specific legisla-
tion, 2 the court failed to consider the desirability of a uniform state-
wide process for objective selection of jury members and thus left
unaltered the present disparate Tennessee statutes, which allow for
the interplay of subjective criteria, thereby restricting the possibil-
ity that the jury will be composed of a reasonable cross section of
the community. Moreover, the court's refusal to address the ques-
tion of discriminatory exclusion of women from the jury selection
process allows women to avoid jury service on less than excusable
grounds and seriously impairs a defendant's opportunity to be tried
by a jury composed of a reasonable cross section of the populace.
21. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-108 (1955). See also note 15 supra.
22. 529 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1975).
23. Under the Davidson County procedure, random selection of jurors is not mandatory,
and the selecting body otherwise has the discretion to include only "upright and intelligent"
qualified residents of the county. 1947 Tenn. Priv. Acts 153, 155, ch. 53. See note 20 supra
and accompanying text.
24. Defendant's strongest assertion was directed at alleged racial imbalance on both
grand and petit juries. Defendant argued that because never more than one black had served
on a grand jury for a single term of court since 1950, criminal judges and jury commissioners
deliberately limited the number of blacks selected for grand and petit juries solely because
of their race. 529 S.W.2d at 679.
25. Reference is to the opinion of the court of criminal appeals, which the supreme court
published as an appendix to its per curiam opinion affirming that court's determination.
26. 529 S.W.2d at 677.
27. Canaday v. State, 461 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Flynn v. State, 203
Tenn. 337, 313 S.W.2d 248 (1958).
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The constitutionality of the Tennessee self-exemption provision
appears questionable in light of the United States Supreme Court's
mandate in Taylor v. Louisiana,"8 which determined that a Loui-
siana statute placing an affirmative burden on women to have their
names entered on jury rolls was unconstitutional under the sixth
amendment's cross section requirement."
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the sixth amendment's
mandate that jury selection procedures include a reasonable cross
section of the populace places a significant burden on the Tennessee
Supreme Court to ensure that those requirements are met. In subse-
quent challenges to the Tennessee jury selection process the court
should consider the cross section requirement mandated by Su-
preme Court holdings.3 The court also should seek guidance from
the Federal Act and the Uniform Act, which meet the standards of
the cross section requirement by establishing a uniform objective
procedure that eliminates the possibility of subjective compilation
of master jury rolls.
Ill. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Standard of Competence for Criminal Defense Counsel
The sixth amendment provides a criminal defendant with the
right to representation by counsel.3' By requiring that an accused be
granted "effective assistance of counsel, ' 3 the United States Su-
preme Court has determined that the right to counsel extends be-
yond the mere presence of an attorney at trial. Additionally, the
Court has provided that the denial of this right violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and entitles the crimi-
nal defendant to a new trial. 3 The Court, however, has failed to
28. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29. For a discussion of the impact of Taylor v. Louisiana on § 22-108 of the Tennessee
Code, see Daughtrey, supra note 6. See also 41 Mo. L. REv. 446 (1976).
30. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
32. Powell v. Alabama, 387 U.S. 45 (1932), initially determined that the court has a
duty not only to ensure the presence of counsel at defendant's trial, but also to require that
counsel provide effective aid in the preparation and defense of the case. See also White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). But see Hester v. United States,
303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 847 (1962); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d
787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U,.S. 850 (1958); Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir.
1949).
For a discussion of these cases and the right to effective assistance of counsel, see Gard,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 483 (1976).
33. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[Vol. 30:691
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articulate specific guidelines for measuring the competency of de-
fense counsel.
In the absence of specific guidelines, the federal circuit courts
have developed three tests for determining whether the representa-
tion afforded a criminal defendant meets the effective assistance
requirement. The First,34 Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits"
strictly adhere to the "farce and mockery" standard announced by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Diggs v. Welch."s Under the
Diggs standard, a defendant is denied due process if his attorney's
conduct makes the trial "a farce, sham, or mockery of justice. ' 37 The
application of this standard generally is predicated on a showing by
the defendant that his counsel acted with extreme irresponsibility.
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have modified the "farce and mock-
ery" rule in an attempt to provide more objective guidelines for
gauging the quality of representation by defense counsel. The
Fourth Circuit, in Coles v. Peyton,39 adopted the general "farce and
mockery" approach, but also enunciated specific criteria to aid in a
competency determination. 0 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has fol-
lowed the basic approach of the "farce and mockery" guideline,
requiring the defendant to show that his attorney acted in such a
34. The standard was adopted initially in Bottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930 (1st
Cir. 1970). See also Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220 (1st Cir. 1974). Recent opinions from the
First Circuit, however, indicate a strong possibility that the court may adopt the "reasonably
competent assistance" rule. See United States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir.
1976); Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 503-05 (1st Cir. 1974).
35. United States v. Ortega-Alvarez, 506 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95
S. Ct. 1559 (1975); United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); United States
ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 477 F.2d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1973); Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 665
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1970); Johnson v. United States, 380 F.2d 810,
812 (10th Cir. 1967).
36. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
37. 148 F.2d at 670. For a discussion of the "farce and mockery" standard, see 22 WAYNE
L. REv. 913, 914-15 (1976).
38. See generally Comment, The Right to Competent Defense Counsel: Emergence of
a Sixth Amendment Standard of Review on Appeal and the Persistence of the "Sham and
Farce" Rule in California, 15 SANTA CLA4A LAw. 355, 357-64 (1975); 37 MoNT. L. Rxv. 387,
390-93 (1976); 63 Ky. L.J. 803 (1975).
39. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
40. The principles may be simply stated: Counsel for an indigent defendant should
be appointed promptly. Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare
to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as
often as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defenses or to
ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate
investigations. . . allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial. An
omission or failure to abide by these requirements constitutes a denial of effective repre-
sentation. . .unless the state, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of
these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby.
Id. at 226. See also United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 177 (4th Cir. 1975).
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manner as to constitute extreme misfeasance or nonfeasance." More
recent opinions, however, evidence a movement away from this
strict standard toward a test that measures a defense attorney's
performance against the customary skill and diligence that a com-
petent attorney reasonably would employ under similar circumstan-
ces. 
42
In an effort to overcome difficulties inherent in the subjective
"farce and mockery" test, the Fifth,43 Sixth," and Ninth45 Circuits
have enunciated a second guideline that focuses on the reasonable-
ness of the assistance provided to a defendant. 6 More specifically,
the "reasonably effective assistance" test measures the extent to
which counsel is likelyto render and does render reasonably effec-
tive assistance." The District of Columbia Circuit has adopted a
similar reasonableness standard, requiring that a defendant receive
"the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his
diligent conscientious advocate."4 In an attempt to define this
standard, the court expressly incorporated the general guidelines set
forth in the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense
Function."
41. Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Cardarella v.
United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967).
42. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976); Crismon v. United
States, 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975). Several of these opinions refer specifically to the
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION]. See Wolfs v. Britton, 509
F.2d 304, 309-11 (8th Cir. 1975); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 213-18 (8th Cir. 1974).
For a discussion of McQueen, see Note, 43 GEO. WASH. L.J. 1384 (1975).
43. Hudson v. Alabama, 493 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
45. United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975). See also United States v.
Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. For a discussion of general aspects behind the trend away from the "farce and
mockery" rule and toward a more liberal standard, see Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases: Changing Standards and Practical
Consequences, 7 CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 427 (1975).
47. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). Although the Beasley
court adopts a reasonableness test, certain language in the opinion indicates that the stan-
dard adopted by the Third Circuit will satisfy this requirement. 491 F.2d at 696. See notes
50 & 51 infra. Beasley also provides that defense counsel "must conscientiously protect his
client's interest, undeflected by conflicting considerations," and further, "must investigate
all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and must assert them in a
proper and timely manner." 491 F.2d at 696.
48. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. (1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often as neces-
sary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable.
Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions
necessary to preserve them.. . Counsel should also be concerned with the accused's
[Vol. 30:691
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In Moore v. United States"0 the Third Circuit adopted a third
competency test, which provides that the standard of effective legal
assistance is "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge
which normally prevails at the time and place." 51 This standard
comports with general torts concepts and operates to examine objec-
tively a defense attorney's performance by focusing solely on the
conduct reasonably expected of professional counsel.2
Although the circuit courts have endeavored to establish a gen-
eral test by which to measure the "effective assistance" require-
ment, strong disagreement exists as to the specific standard to be
applied in judging adequacy of defense counsel. In an attempt to
resolve this dilemma, courts and commentators have focused on the
guidelines contained in the American Bar Association Standards
Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function.53
Incorporating the applicable provisions of the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility,54 the ABA Defense Function Standards pro-
vide specific guidelines that delineate the proper conduct for a de-
fense attorney in situations requiring expertise of professional coun-
sel and set forth detailed criteria to assist the trial court in deter-
mining whether the conduct of a defense attorney comports with the
"effective assistance" requirement. 5
right to be released from custody pending trial, and be prepared, where appropriate, to
make motions for a pre-trial psychiatric examination or suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to
determine what matters of defense can be developed .
ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.
50. 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
51. Id. at 736. See also United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 174 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976); United States v. Mitchell, 540 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir.
1976).
52. See generally Gard, supra note 32, at 495-96.
53. ABA STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 42. While the ABA Defense Func-
tion Standards expressly state that they are intended as guides for conduct of lawyers and as
the basis for disciplinary action, and are not intended to be criteria for judicial evaluation of
the effectiveness of counsel, several courts and commentators have urged the consideration
of the standards as criteria for the "effective assistance" requirement. See id. at § 1.1(f).
54. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STAN-
DARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969). Throughout the ABA Defense Function
Standards, the drafters indicated strong reliance on various provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
55. As paraphrased, the specific criteria enunciated under the defense counsel stan-
dards provide that
(1) an attorney must confer with his client as early as possible and as often as neces-
sary;
(2) counsel must advise his client of the charges against him and of his rights;
(3) counsel must ascertain and develop all appropriate defenses;
(4) counsel must conduct all necessary investigations;
19771
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Tennessee supreme courts traditionally have followed a strict
interpretation of the "farce and mockery" rule. 6 The present su-
preme court, however, in Baxter v. Rose,5" abandoned the subjective
criteria inherent in this rule in favor of the guidelines enunciated by
the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits." As stated by the
court, the standard "is simply whether the advice given, or the
services rendered by the attorney, are within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 9 The court thus
adopted a test subjecting a defense attorney to the standard of
competence reasonably demanded of ordinary defense counsel.
Moreover, the court expressly embraced the ABA Defense Function
Standards, advising both trial courts and defense counsel to be
guided by the standards in determining the boundaries of the rea-
sonable competence requirement. 0 The Baxter opinion also re-
versed a series of prior Tennessee decisions that distinguished com-
petency challenges against court-appointed attorneys from those
against privately retained counsel.' Acknowledging that constitu-
tional rights must be applied equally to both indigent and non-
indigent defendants the present court abolished all distinction be-
tween the quality of services rendered by appointed and privately
retained counsel.62
The Baxter opinion forecasts changes in the quality of criminal
defense representation in Tennessee. No longer will the subjective
"farce and mockery" standard measure the conduct of defense
counsel. Instead, both appointed and privately retained counsel are
(5) counsel must allow time for reflection and preparation;
(6) counsel must explore the possibility of disposition without trial, granting deference
to the informed decision of the accused;
(7) counsel must conduct the trial in a responsible and efficient manner; and
(8) the lawyer for the accused should be familiar with sentencing alternatives, the right
of appeal, and post conviction remedies, and respond to each available situation respon-
sibly and with consent of a fully informed client.
See ABA STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNcTiON, supra note 42.
56. See State ex rel. Richmond v. Henderson, 222 Tenn. 597, 439 S.W.2d 263 (1969);
notes 34-37 supra.
57. 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
58. See notes 44 & 48 supra and accompanying text.
59. 523 S.W.2d at 936. The language adopted by the Tennessee court was derived
expressly from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970), which held that the advice rendered by an attorney on the admissibility of
a criminal accused's confession must be "within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases."
60. 523 S.W.2d at 936.
61. See Long v. State, 510 SW.2d 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Bomar, 213
Tenn. 699, 378 S.W.2d 772 (1964).
62. 523 S.W.2d at 936-38.
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subject to a reasonable competency standard that more closely com-
ports with the sixth amendment requirement of reasonably effective
counsel. Further, the specific provisions of the ABA Defense Func-
tion Standards have been proffered to guide trial courts and defense
counsel in a determination of reasonable competency. The present
court, therefore, has taken an essential step toward promoting a
defendant's right to effective counsel and has created a judicial
atmosphere conducive to full and adequate representation for all
criminal defendants.
B. Right to Have an Attorney Present at a Preliminary Hearing
In Powell v. Alabama3 the United States Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to coun-
sel at each stage of a criminal prosecution. 4 During the past decade,
the Court has expanded significantly the proceedings at which a
state is required to furnish counsel to an indigent accused. 5 The
Court in Coleman v. Alabama,"6 focusing on the right to counsel at
a preliminary hearing, held that the state is required constitution-
ally to furnish counsel when the statutory scheme establishes the
63. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
64. Powell stated that because there is an overwhelming chance that a defendant who
is not provided effective counsel at every step in criminal proceedings will be prejudiced, the
state must furnish an opportunity for counsel prior to trial. Id. at 69.
65. The right to counsel has been expanded in the following cases: Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in many state misdemeanor cases); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at pre-indictment identification); Adams v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 278 (1971); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel attaches at
certain preliminary hearings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel attaches
to a probation revocation hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel required in post-indictment lineups); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel
attaches in juvenile proceedings in which institutional confinement could result); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel mandated during custodial interrogations);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel attaches during station house
interrogations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel attaches to all
felony prosecutions); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel for an
indigent seeking an appeal in state courts).
For a general discussion of the growth of the right to counsel, see Symposium, The Right
to Counsel and the Indigent Defendant: Preface, 12 AM. Cam. L. REv. 587-89 (1975); Note,
Of Trumpeters, Pipers, and Swingmen: What Tune Is the Burger Court Playing in Right to
Representation Cases?, 29 VAND. L. REv. 776 (1976); 41 U. COLO. L. Rev. 473 (1969).
66. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). For analysis of the Coleman decision, see Note, Constitutional
Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 75 DICK. L. Rev. 143 (1970); 9 DuQ. L. REv.
522 (1971); 45 Tu.. L. REv. 1056 (1971).
67. 399 U.S. at 9. The Court specifically noted that under the challenged Alabama
statute, the sole purpose of a preliminary hearing was to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence against an accused to warrant presenting the case to the grand jury, and to fix bond
if it is appropriate. 399 U.S. at 8. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 139, 140, 151 (1954).
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preliminary hearing as a critical stage in the prosecution of an indi-
gent accused. Stating that the characterization of the preliminary
hearing as a critical stage depends upon the statute's inherent po-
tential for substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights and the
extent to which the assistance of counsel could reduce that preju-
dice,6" the Court specified four factors that are relevant to the criti-
cal stage determination: (1) the importance of an attorney's exami-
nation and cross-examination in exposing weaknesses in the state's
case that may lead a magistrate to release the accused; (2) the use
of counsel's examination and cross-examination as a means to pre-
serve vital evidence or to aid in impeachment at trial; (3) the ability
of an attorney to use the preliminary hearing as a discovery tool; and
(4) the effectiveness of an attorney in making arguments to gain bail
or to secure an early psychiatric examination for the accused."
Therefore, although Coleman did not establish an absolute right to
the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing, the decision did
provide a workable set of criteria for determining whether the scope
of the preliminary hearing as established by statute requires the
assistance of counsel.
Significantly, legislation proposed or enacted immediately
prior to and subsequent to Coleman requires a court to furnish an
indigent accused the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing.
As amended in 1970,0 the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that
an indigent accused should be represented by counsel from his ini-
tial appearance before a United States magistrate and in all ancil-
lary matters arising in the criminal proceedings. 7' Echoing the pol-
icy adopted in the federal act, the American Bar Association further
recommends that an accused should be granted the assistance of
counsel prior to the commencement of a preliminary hearing. 72 Ad-
ditionally, the Pre-Arraignment Code drafted by the American Law
Institute expressly includes the right to counsel at a preliminary
hearing. Noting the value of a preliminary hearing both for discov-
68. 399 U.S. at 9. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
69. 399 U.S. at 9. The Court stated that the indigent defendant's inability to realize
these advantages without the assistance of counsel "compels the conclusion that the Alabama
preliminary hearing is a 'critical stage' of the State's criminal process at which the accused
is 'as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.'" Id. at 9-10.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970).
72. ABA STANDARDS, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5.1 (1968) explicitly states:
Counsel should be provided to the accused as soon as feasible after he is taken into
custody, when he appears before a committing magistrate, or when he is formally
charged, whichever occurs earliest.
Id.
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ery and for initially determining the existence of probable cause,73
the ALI Model Code establishes that a criminal defendant has an
absolute right to an adversary preliminary hearing,74 which neces-
sarily includes a right to the assistance of counsel.75
Under section 40-1131 of the Tennessee Code,7" the criminal
defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing prior to presentment
and indictment.7 Prior to 1974, courts construing section 40-1131
determined that the preliminary hearing granted by the statute is
not a critical stage in a defendant's prosecution.78 In McKeldin v.
State," however, the present supreme court expressly overruled past
decisions, finding the preliminary hearing provided under the Ten-
nessee statute directly analogous to the Alabama procedure that the
Court in Coleman found to constitute a critical stage requiring the
presence of counsel."0 The McKeldin court focused specifically on
the ability of counsel to aid a defendant at the early stages of prose-
cution, stating:
Every criminal lawyer "worth his salt" knows the overriding importance
and the manifest advantages of a preliminary hearing. In fact the failure to
exploit this golden opportunity to observe the manner, demeanor and appear-
ance of the witnesses for the prosecution, to learn the precise details of the
prosecution's case, and to engage in that happy event sometimes known as a
"fishing expedition," would be an inexcusable dereliction of duty in the major-
ity of cases.8
Determining that a preliminary hearing under the Tennessee stat-
ute is a critical stage in a prosecution and following the rationale
73. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official Draft 1975)
[hereinafter cited as the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE].
74. MODEL PEE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 73, at §§ 330.1-.9,
75. See MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 73, at § 310.1(5) & §§ 310.1(5), 330.2
Comments.
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1131 (Supp. 1976).
77. Id. The remainder of the statute states:
If the accused is indicted during the period of time in which his preliminary hearing
is being continued, or at anytime before accused has been afforded a preliminary hearing
on a warrant, he may abate the indictment on motion to the court. Provided, however,
that no such motion for abatement shall be granted after the expiration of thirty (30)
days from the date of the accused's arrest.
Id. This provision generally is maintained under the STATE OF TENNESSEE LAW REvISION
COMMISSION, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 40-904, 40-907 (Proposed Final Draft 1973)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSED TENN. CODE].
78. See Harris v. Neil, 437 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1971); Shadden v. State, 488 S.W.2d 54
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). In Harris, the court distinguished the Tennessee procedure from
the Alabama "pretrial type of arraignment where certain rights may be sacrificed or lost."
437 F.2d at 64 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970)).
79. 516 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1974).
80. Id. at 85.
81. Id. at 85-86.
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expressed in Coleman,2 the court held that the sixth amendment
guarantees an indigent accused the right to effective assistance of
counsel at a preliminary hearing.s3
The court's holding in McKeldin is a promising step toward
ensuring an indigent accused the means to present a fair and reason-
able defense. The opinion, expressly rejecting prior decisions, more
accurately reflects the nature of the Tennessee preliminary hearing
as an important stage in a criminal prosecution and enunciates a
policy that comports with the constitutional requirements deline-
ated by the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama.
C. Indigent Defendant's Right to Simultaneous Self-
Representation and Assistance of Counsel
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the
sixth amendment guarantees an indigent defendant the right to
defend himself without the aid of counsel when that decision is
made voluntarily and intelligently. 4 Although the Court also has
recognized the right to the assistance of counsel, 5 it has not ad-
dressed whether these two constitutional rights are mutually exclu-
sive. Federal courts interpreting the right to self-representation
granted by 28 U.S.C. § 16546 have adopted an "either-or" ap-
proach, mandating that in all but the most extraordinary circum-
stances a criminal defendant must choose between appointed coun-
sel and self-representation. 7 Following the federal approach, a ma-
82. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
83. The procedure recommended by the Tennessee court closely paralleled that ex-
pressed in PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, at § 40-902, which provides that the magis-
trate must explain the charge and inform the defendant of his right to remain silent and his
right to retain or have counsel appointed. Section 40-902 further requires the magistrate to
allow the defendant a reasonable time and opportunity to confer with counsel unless the right
is waived in writing in accordance with § 40-3202. Although drafted prior to the McKeldin
decision, the comments to the section expressly overrule the Harris opinion, noting that under
Tennessee procedure the preliminary hearing is a critical stage in a prosecution. Id. at § 40-
902.
84. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
85. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). For a discussion of the impact of
Faretta on the right of self-representation, see Comment, The Constitutional Right of Self-
Representation: Faretta and the "Assistance of Counsel," 3 PEPPERDINE L. Rv. 336 (1976);
29 ARK. L. REv. 546 (1976).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) provides:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein.
87. See United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Plattner,
330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), petition for
cert. dismissed on petitioner's motion, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion to vacate denied, 349 U.S.
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jority of states have defined an indigent defendant's right to dual
representation as a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial
judge and have noted that only on limited occasions should the right
be exercised. 8 This qualification persists even in the presence of
state constitutional language that provides an accused with the
right to defend in person and by counsel. 9 The rationale for this
interpretation is that the constitutional provisions merely grant the
trial judge the ability to allow simultaneous self-representation and
assistance of counsel in those cases in which such procedure is vital
to an accused's defense. 0
In State v. Burkhart,' the Tennessee Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the state or federal constitutions guarantee an indi-
gent defendant the right to dual representation.2 Focusing initially
on defendant's claim under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, 3
the court determined that the federal constitution, although guar-
anteeing an accused the right to self-representation and the right to
appointed counsel, does not require the simultaneous exercise of
those rights. The court concluded that under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments a defendant must make a choice between self-
representation and representation by counsel in the absence of ex-
traordinary situations in which a trial judge, using his discretion,
943 (1955); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Note, The Pro
Se Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 927, 927-30 (1972); Comment, Self-
Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALiF. L. REv.
1479, 1482 (1971).
88. See Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1967); People v. Bright, 78 Ill.
App. 2d 2, 223 N.E.2d 215 (1966); McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947);
State v. Townes, 522 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. 1974); Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750 (Okla. Crim.
1975).
89. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813 n.10 (1975), the Court points out that
statutory or constitutional provisions in twenty-five states, including Tennessee, grant the
accused the right to defend in person and by counsel. Generally each of these states interprets
its constitution or statutory provision to grant the trial judge discretion to allow or disallow
dual representation. E.g., Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836 (1970); Moore v.
People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970); People v. Richardson, 4 N.Y.2d 224, 173 N.Y.S.
587, 149 N.E.2d 875, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 943 (1958); State v. Whitlow, 13 Ore. App. 607,
510 P.2d 1354 (1973). See also discussion in State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tenn.
1976); 41 U. CN. L. REv. 927, 929 (1972). Faretta further notes that six states recognize the
right to dual representation. 422 U.S. at 813 n.10.
90. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
91. 541 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1976).
92. Although the defendant in Burkhart sought and received appointed counsel, he
additionally wanted to cross-examine witnesses and argue to the jury. Id.
93. Defendant alleged that the sixth amendment, when read in conjunction with the
fourteenth amendment, guarantees an accused the right to simultaneous self-representation
and appointed counsel. Id. at 367-68.
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allows the assertion of both rights in the same trial.94 Turning to
defendant's claim under Article 1, Section 9 of the Tennessee Con-
stitution,95 which provides that a defendant has the right to be heard
"by himself and his counsel,""6 the court determined that the legis-
lative and judicial history behind the Tennessee provisions did not
support the claimed right to be heard in person and by counsel
simultaneously.97 The court, however, affirmed that there are lim-
ited circumstances in which a trial judge may permit a defendant,
who is represented by counsel, to participate in his own defense
through both cross-examination of witnesses and argument to the
jury. Acknowledging that this exception to the general rule is a
matter entirely within the discretion of the trial court, the Burkhart
opinion limited this discretionary power to situations in which the
defendant has the intelligence, ability, and competence to partici-
pate and is not seeking to disrupt trial procedure. 8 By holding that
the right to simultaneous self-representation and assistance of coun-
sel is discretionary rather than mandatory under either the federal
or state constitution, the supreme court's decision in Burkhart com-
ports with the majority of state and federal opinions. To a certain
extent, however, the Burkhart opinion fails to follow the lead of
previous right to counsel questions addressed by the court. The
court not only found no constitutional right to dual representation,
but it also indicated that a trial court should allow an indigent
accused simultaneous self-representation and assistance of counsel
only in very rare circumstances. By limiting a defendant's exercise
of dual representation, the court failed to focus on the beneficial
aspects of allowing a defendant to cross-examine witnesses and to
argue his case before the jury. There might be many occasions on
which a defendant, granted the opportunity to employ dual repre-
94. In examining the history of judicial decision-making the court noted four conclu-
sions, stating:
The rules that emerge from these cases are (1) that a criminal defendant has a right
to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) that he has a constitutional right to represent
himself; (3) that he may not be forced to accept the service of counsel, and . . .(4) that
he must make a choice between self-representation and representation by counsel.
Id. at 368.
95. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
96. Id. (emphasis supplied). The statutory right to dual representation is codified in
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2001 (1975).
97. The court found that the constitutional and statutory provisions were enacted to
abrogate common law rules that denied a criminal defendant the right to be a witness in his
own defense, and further expressed no guarantee of a right to counsel. 541 S.W.2d at 366-67.
98. Id. at 371-72. The court stated, however, that the defendant's participation would
be limited to fair comment on the evidence and that unsworn statements would not be
permitted.
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sentation, effectively could exploit his personal knowledge to pres-
ent a more effective defense, and at the same time, through advice
of counsel, avoid the embarrassment and inefficiency arising from
the lack of familiarity of judicial procedures. By failing to outline
the positive criteria inherent in the implementation of simultaneous
self-representation and assistance of counsel the court overlooked
some of the more important attributes of dual representation.
IV. DIScOvERY
A. Indigent Defendant's Right to Transcript of Prior Criminal
Proceedings
Beginning with Griffin v. Illinois,"9 United States Supreme
Court decisions'"0 have acknowledged an indigent defendant's con-
stitutional right'"' to receive from the state free transcripts of a past
trial on which the defendant seeks an appeal and of any collateral
proceeding attendant to a criminal prosecution. 0 This right is not
absolute, but is conditioned upon an indigent defendant's ability to
establish affirmatively a particularized need for such transcript.' 3
In an attempt to establish workable guidelines for showing a parti-
cularized need, the Court, in Britt v. North Carolina, 0" identified a
two-prong test that measures both the value of the transcript to the
defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is
sought, and the availability to the defendant of alternative devices
that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.0 5 Thus, under
the Court's "particularized need" standard, an indigent is entitled
to a free trial transcript only upon a showing that denial of a tran-
script will result in specific harm or that available alternatives do
not adequately protect his interests.' Further, the Court has deter-
99. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
100. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison
Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
101. The decisions have found a violation of both the due process clause and the equal
protection clause. Compare Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) with Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
102. Griffin originally applied solely to appellate review. This right, however, has been
expanded to include the transcript of any stage in a criminal proceeding in which the tran-
script is necessary to ensure an adequate defense. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226
(1971). Further, the right is applicable both to indigent misdemeanants and to felons.
103. See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969).
104. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 227-31.
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mined that a defendant is entitled only to that portion of the tran-
script required to fulfill his express needs,0 thereby limiting access
to a full record to situations in which a defendant establishes a
colorable need for a complete transcript. ' In applying these stan-
dards, the Court consistently has balanced an indigent accused's
right to obtain the tools essential to his defense with the financial
burdens that would result from requiring the state to provide a full
transcript automatically upon the conclusion of each proceeding in
a criminal prosecution.' 9
After Griffin v. Illinois, the Tennessee legislature enacted stat-
utes governing the state's duty to furnish an indigent defendant
seeking an appeal with an official transcript of a prior proceeding."0
Although the statutes refer only to transcripts for the purpose of
appeal, the courts consistently have recognized that an indigent
defendant's right to a trial transcript attaches during an ongoing
criminal prosecution if a clear need for a record is established.",
Unfortunately, previous supreme courts failed to clarify what re-
quirements must be met in order to establish a clear need.
Faced with this amorphous concept, the present Tennessee
Supreme Court sought to provide specific criteria in State v.
Elliott. 1,2 In Elliott an indigent defendant sought reversal of homi-
cide and robbery convictions, alleging that the trial court had com-
mitted reversible error by failing to provide the transcript of a
pretrial hearing at which the defendant had argued for the suppres-
sion of an oral confession and also by failing to furnish transcripts
of the previous trial of co-indicted defendants. Pointing to the Su-
preme Court requirement that an indigent defendant establish a
"particularized need" in order to obtain a transcript, the court
quoted with approval Britt's two-prong test as the standard for
determining the sufficiency of that need."' Because prior case law
provided no specific criteria by which an indigent's "particularized
107. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963).
108. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971).
109. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
110. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2040 (1975) provides in part:
If the defendant prays and is granted an appeal, and is determined by the trial judge to
be without sufficient funds to pay for the preparation of the transcript of the proceed-
ings, the trial judge shall direct the court reporter to furnish the defendant a complete
transcript of the proceedings . ...
It is important to note that the Proposed Code of Criminal Procedure makes no substantive
change in the language used. See PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, at § 40-3223(f).
111. Bowers v. State, 512 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
112. 524 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1975).
113. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
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need" might be evaluated,"' the Tennessee court attempted to es-
tablish more concrete guidelines.
Initially, the court determined that an indigent defendant's
right to a transcript is restricted to the right to a record of a prior
criminal proceeding in which the indigent himself was a party. The
court expressly refused to extend the transcript doctrine to include
records of testimony in a third party's trial in which witnesses testi-
fied against the indigent defendant."' Further, in establishing
guidelines for judging the "particularized need" of an indigent ac-
cused, the court focused on two controlling criteria. Specifically, the
court determined that the transcript right encompasses only occa-
sions in which the trial court finds that the transcript provides
significant assistance in preparation for trial or aids in impeaching
adverse witnesses." 6 Moreover, the court indicated that the
"particularized need" requirement has not been satisfied unless
these express criteria are met. Finally, when a trial court determines
that a minimal need exists, the present supreme court advises that
a transcript be provided to the indigent, thereby eliminating any
ground for appeal based on the failure to adhere to the transcript
doctrine."'
Although the Elliott court's formulation is an important ad-
vancement in the attempt to establish criteria by which the
"particularized need" requirement uniformly can be applied, this
formulation contains a major deficiency. By precluding an indigent
defendant from obtaining transcripts of prior testimony given in the
trial of a codefendant by witnesses expected to testify against the
indigent, the court seemingly has restricted an indigent accused's
access to material that not only would provide significant assistance
in preparation for his trial, but also would aid in the impeachment
of adverse witnesses. Under Griffin, which grants indigent defen-
dants the same opportunity as wealthier defendants to obtain an
adequate defense, a strong argument exists that the court's failure
to extend the transcript doctrine to testimony of witnesses in a third
party's trial reasonably expected to testify against the indigent ac-
cused unduly restricts the boundaries of the transcript doctrine.
114. 524 S.W.2d at 476-77.
115. Id. at 476.
116. Id. at 477.
117. Id.
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B. Scope of Defendant's Right to Inspect Contraband Substances
Held by the Prosecution for Use at Trial
Both courts and legislatures recently have exhibited a keen
awareness of the need to update criminal discovery procedures." 8
The United States Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions
designed to encourage more liberal inspection by an accused of ma-
terial prosecution evidence to be introduced at trial."' In Brady v.
Maryland,'2 0 for example, the Court found a due process violation
when the prosecution suppressed material evidence favorable to an
accused after the accused had requested inspection.' 1 Further, the
Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida22 rejected the "game or sur-
prise theory" of criminal discovery, announcing that the policy of
discovery is to ensure that both a defendant and the state have
ample opportunity to investigate those facts crucial to the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence.'2
Prompted by the Supreme Court, Congress, in 1975, amended
rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 24 to guarantee
a defendant the right to inspect government evidence that is mate-
rial to the preparation of his defense or that the prosecution expects
to use at trial.' 25 Only one federal district court has interpreted rule
16(a) as applied to a defendant's motion to require the government
to furnish samples of contraband substances for inspection and in-
118. See Gaynor, Defendant's Right to Discovery in Criminal Cases, 20 CLEV. STATE L.
REv. 31 (1970); Kane, Criminal Discovery-The Circuitous Road to a Two-Way Street, 7 U.
SAN FRAN. L. REV. 203 (1973).
119. Compare United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) with Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
120. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
121. Id. at 87.
122. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
123. The Court defined the "game theory" of justice in the following terms:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game
in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.
Id. at 82.
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) [hereinafter cited as Rule 16(a)] provides in part:
(c) Documents and Tangible Objects. Upon request of the defendant the govern-
ment shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies of portions
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and
which are material to the preparation of his defense or are intended for use by the
government as evidence in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defen-
dant.
125. See generally Comment, Expanding Defendant's Discovery: The Jencks Act at
Pretrial Hearings, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 419 (1975); MacCarthy & Forde, Discovery in Criminal
Cases Under the New Local Rules of the Federal Court, 52 CHI. B. REc. 41 (1970).
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dependent analysis. In United States v. Pollock, "I the Massachu-
setts District Court expressly found that discovery of this nature is
contemplated by rule 16 and determined that a motion requesting
such relief should be allowed if the defendant shows that the pro-
posed inspection and analysis is reasonable and might be material
to his defense."'
Several state jurisdictions also have attempted to define the
scope of a criminal defendant's right to inspect prosecution evi-
dence, with particular emphasis on whether a defendant can require
the state to furnish the accused samples of contraband substances
for independent analysis.' 8 As a result of the increased attention
given criminal discovery at the state level, two legislative drafts, the
American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Discovery and
Procedure Before Trial (ABA Discovery Standards) 29 and the Uni-
form Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 421,130 have been promul-
gated to aid states in their consideration of inspection procedures.
The ABA Discovery Standards primarily encourage a liberal
scope of inspection, providing that the policy behind pre-trial dis-
covery should be as "full and free as possible" in order to promote
adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trials, minimize
surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and
meet the requirements of due process. 3' The ABA Discovery Stan-
126. 402 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Mass. 1975).
127. Id. at 1312. Generally federal procedure requires a defendant to make an affirma-
tive showing that the discovery procedure will be both reasonable and useful. See 1971 Wis.
L. REv. 614, 619.
128. The vast majority of state jurisdictions have statutory sections that grant a defen-
dant the general right to inspect prosecution-held evidence. At least ten states have recog-
nized by statute or through judicial construction that the right of inspection includes the
opportunity to perform reasonable independent testing of such evidence. See WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.23(5) (West 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1803(c) (1969); F.R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)(A), (C), (D); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973); State v. Migliore,
261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972); State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84 (Me. 1973); Jackson v. State,
243 So. 2d 396 (1970), aff'd 261 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1972); People v. Spencer, 79 Misc. 2d 72,
361 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Terrell v. State, 521 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Crim. 1975). Contra
Mobley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 80, 202 S.E.2d 465 (1975).
129. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved
Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY].
130. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIM. PROCEDURE 421 [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM RULE 4211.
131. See ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 129, § 1.2. Further, ABA STANDARDS,
DISCOVERY, § 1.1 details the purpose of discovery:
(a) Procedures prior to trial should serve the following needs:
(i) to promote an expeditious as well as fair determination of the charges,
whether by plea or trial;
(ii) to provide the accused sufficient information to make an informed plea;
(iii) to permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial;
(iv) to avoid unnecessary and repetitious trials by exposing any latent proce-
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dards expressly require the prosecutor, upon request by the defen-
dant, to make available for both inspection and testing evidence
intended for use at trial. 3
2
Subsequent to the publication of the ABA project, the National
Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws drafted Uniform
Rule 421.'13 Although closely resembling the broad inspection proce-
dures found in its ABA counterpart, Uniform Rule 421 contains
several significant differences. First, instead of requiring the defen-
dant to secure a court order before allowing access to prosecution-
held evidence, Uniform Rule 421 grants an accused automatic ac-
cess to the information. '34 Further, Uniform Rule 421 provides spe-
cific criteria for determining the scope of a defendant's right to
perform independent analysis on such evidence.'35 Thus both legis-
lative models promote the liberal development of a defendant's
right to inspect prosecution-held evidence by allowing reasonable
independent testing by the defendant of contraband substances.
In State v. Gaddis'3' the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted
the modern view that an accused should be allowed to inspect con-
dural or constitutional issues and affording remedies therefor prior to trial;
(v) to reduce interruptions and complications of trials by identifying issues
collateral to guilt or innocence, and determining them prior to trial; and
(vi) to effect economies in time, money, and judicial and professional talents
by minimizing paperwork, repetitious assertions of issues, and the number of separate
hearings.
132. ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY, supra note 129, § 2.2 states in part that the prosecu-
tor's obligations include:
(i) notifying defense counsel that material and information, described in gen-
eral terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied or photographed during specified
reasonable times; and
(ii) making available to defense counsel at the time specified such material
and information, and suitable facilities or other arrangements for inspection, testing,
copying and photographing of such material and information. (emphasis supplied).
133. See UNIFORM RULE 421, supra note 130, Comment.
134. Id.
135. UNIFORM RULE 421, supra note 130, provides:
In affording this access, the prosecuting attorney shall allow the defendant at any
reasonable time and in any reasonable manner to inspect, photograph, copy, or have
reasonable tests made. If a scientific test or experiment of any matter may preclude or
impair any further tests or experiments, the prosecuting attorney shall give the defen-
dant and any person known or believed to have an interest in the matter reasonable
notice and opportunity to be present and to have an expert observe or participate in the
test or experiment.
UNIFORm RuLE 421, Comments, provide that the limitations "in any reasonable manner" and
"reasonable tests" are designed to allow the prosecutor a means by which to place reasonable
limitations on the manner in which an analysis is carried out. Moreover, the court is not
involved in the discovery procedure at all unless the defendant determines that the limita-
tions placed on testing are unduly restrictive and petitions the court for relief.
136. 530 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1975).
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traband material obtained from him by the state and held by the
prosecution for use as evidence at trial.13 Gaddis involved a defen-
dant's motion to require the prosecutor to furnish samples of a con-
trolled substance previously seized from the defendant so that the
defense could conduct an independent, scientific analysis of the
substance.'3 The Tennessee Supreme Court found that section 40-
2044 of the Tennessee Code'39 was sufficiently broad to require the
prosecutor to furnish the accused samples of tangible evidence for
the purpose of independent analysis. "' In setting guidelines under
137. For recent discussions on the trend toward more liberal discovery procedures, see
generally Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady?: Discovery in Criminal Cases, 9 CRIM.
L. BULL. 325 (1973); MacCarthy & Forde, supra note 125; Thode, Criminal Discovery: Consti-
tutional Minimums and Statutory Grants in Texas, 1 TEXAS TEcH. L. REv. 183 (1970); Com-
ment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 112 (1972);
Comment, Suppression: The Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to the
Defense, 7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 348 (1973); 1971 Wis. L. REv. 614, 617-18.
138. Defendant in Gaddis was indicted upon a charge of felonious possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to sell or deliver. The defendant later brought the instant
motion before the trial court to obtain a sample of the drug specimen for the purpose of
independent examination. Subsequent to a lower court's ruling that denied defendant's mo-
tion, the supreme court granted certiorari and reversed.
139. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2044 (1975) provides:
Copying certain books, papers and documents held by attorney for state.-Upon
motion of a defendant, or his attorney, at any time after the finding of an indictment or
presentment, the court shall order the attorney for the state, or any law enforcement
officer, to permit the attorney for the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to
the defendant or obtained from others which are in possession of, or under the control
of the attorney for the state or any law enforcement officer. The order may specify a
reasonable time, place and manner of making the inspection, and of taking the copies
or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. However, such
inspection, copying or photographing shall not apply to any work product of any law
enforcement officer or attorney for the state or his agent by any witness other than the
defendant.
The Proposed Tenn. Code, supra note 77, § 40-1504 makes little change in the definition
of "inspection." Patterned after Rule 16(a), § 40-1504 states:
Documents and tangible objects.-Upon motion of the defendant, the court shall
order the district attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or portions
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the state and:
(1) which are material to the preparation of his defense; or
(2) which are intended for use by the state as evidence at the trial; or
(3) which were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
140. The present supreme court, in Gaddis, expressly overruled Kerwin v. State, 512
S.W.2d 632 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974), which previously held that TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2044
(1975) did not envision the right of a defendant to inspect and make analysis of controlled
substances. Kerwin specifically had determined that defendants from whom the substances
had been seized were not entitled to an independent analysis, because they were the "only
persons who knew whether or not they had in fact sold a controlled substance and therefore
they were not denied anything needed in the ascertainment of truth." 512 S.W.2d at 635. The
Gaddis opinion ruled that this approach violated a defendant's presumption of innocence.
530 S.W.2d at 68.
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which to effectuate independent testing the court mandated that
both the prosecutor and the defense counsel must promptly place
on the court record the results of all tests. 4' Moreover, in those cases
in which a chemical analysis will destroy, exhaust, or alter the
identity of the substance, the prosecutor and defense attorney must
come to some agreement on the proper procedure for analysis, and
in all such cases a defendant must be given the opportunity to have
his own expert present at the test.' 42 In reaching its decision, the
supreme court expressly embraced the policies enunciated by the
ABA Discovery Standards, 43 leaving little doubt as to the future
direction of criminal discovery in Tennessee.'
The Gaddis decision is a significant attempt by the present
court to bring criminal discovery procedures in line with the require-
ments of due process. By indicating a willingness to conform to the
general policies announced in the ABA Discovery Standards, and by
issuing an opinion that attempts to resolve those questions posed
under Uniform Rule 421, the supreme court's opinion portends fu-
ture liberalization of a defendant's ability to discover prosecution
evidence.
V. EVIDENCE
A. Search and Seizure: The Automobile
Although under traditional constitutional analysis any search
and seizure conducted without court approval presumptively is in-
valid, and only under exceptional circumstances is a warrantless
search and seizure upheld,'" an exception to the traditional rule,
initially carved out by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll
v. United States,'" provides that an automobile halted on a public
141. 530 S.W.2d at 69.
142. Id.
143. See notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
144. 530 S.W.2d at 69-70. Regarding the future impact of the standards, the court
stated:
While we look upon these standards with general favor, we do not adopt them, at
this time, because some of the situations they address are not before the Court in this
controversy and for the further, and more important reason, that the commission
charged with the responsibility of drafting the Criminal Rules of Procedure is actively
engaged in the formulation of these rules and its final report is expected by the end of
this year. We defer the formulation of further rules pending the incoming of the Commis-
sion's report.
Id. at 70.
145. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
146. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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street or highway may be searched without a warrant147 when proba-
ble cause exists."' The rationale behind the exception is the overrid-
ing concern that an automobile might travel out of the jurisdiction
before a search can be made if police officers first are required to
obtain a judicial warrant.
In 1970 the United States Supreme Court seemingly extended
the circumstances under which a warrantless search and seizure of
an automobile is justified. In Chambers v. Maroney,10 the Court
upheld the warrantless search of an automobile that had been re-
moved to the stationhouse after the arrest of its occupants. 5 ' Unlike
Carroll, there was little danger that the automobile would be driven
out of the jurisdiction prior to the attainment of a warrant. The
majority, however, stressing that probable cause existed at the sta-
tionhouse,15' found no need to distinguish the seizure and holding
of an automobile before presenting the probable cause issue to the
magistrate and the seizure of an automobile followed by an immedi-
ate search.'5 2 Thus the decision in Chambers significantly altered
the application of the Carroll doctrine by making the present mobil-
ity of an automobile subordinate to the existence of probable cause
in determining the validity of a warrantless search.153
In the subsequent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire,'4 how-
147. For a general discussion of the Carroll decision, see Miles & Wefing, The Automo-
bile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 105
(1972); Murray & Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 95 (1970).
148. Probable cause is defined by the Carroll court as "a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction." 267 U.S. at 149.
149. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam
opinion).
150. In Chambers, pursuant to a police bulletin, officers stopped defendant's automo-
bile, arrested the occupants, and drove the automobile to police headquarters. Subsequently,
police searched the automobile, without first obtaining a warrant, and discovered material
evidence that was used at trial to gain a conviction against defendant.
151. 399 U.S. at 52.
152. The court apparently reasoned that the automobile might be removed from the
jurisdiction before a search could be made. For example, a friend or relative could obtain
permission to remove the automobile from police custody. For a discussion of the mobility
issue in Chambers, see Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to
Movable Items, 58 IowA L. REv. 1134, 1142-1144 (1973).
153. See Note, The Warrantless Automobile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28
BAYLOR L. REv. 151 (1976). The Chambers decision turned on the finding of probable cause,
unlike Carroll, which focused particularly on both probable cause and exigent circumstances.
See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 842-45
(1974).
The rationale behind the Chambers decision is still a viable concept under Supreme
Court holdings. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam opinion).
154. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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ever, the Court again confirmed that the mobility of an automobile
is crucial to the validity of a warrantless search and seizure con-
ducted with probable cause. 5' Finding that the automobile searched
was parked in defendant's driveway under circumstances reasona-
bly indicating that it would not be moved out of the jurisdiction
before a warrant could be obtained,'56 the Court overturned the
defendant's conviction and ruled that the search and seizure of
defendant's automobile without a valid warrant violated the fourth
amendment. Further, the Court expressly approved the basic pre-
mise in Carroll, holding that although probable cause exists, a war-
rantless search is not justified unless there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the automobile will be moved out of the jurisdiction
before a warrant may be obtained, '57 thus limiting the broad ration-
ale enunciated in Chambers.
The present Tennessee Supreme Court consistently has upheld
the reasonableness of a warrantless search conducted with probable
cause '5 when there is a likelihood that an automobile will be re-
moved from the jurisdiction before police officers can obtain a war-
155. In Coolidge the defendant was arrested in his home, and officers seized his automo-
bile, which was parked in the driveway. The automobile subsequently was towed to the police
station and a search with defective warrants produced material evidence. In an attempt to
salvage that evidence for use at trial, the prosecutor argued that the search was conducted
under reasonable circumstances because it was not practicable to secure a warrant before the
vehicle could be moved out of the jurisdiction. 403 U.S. at 458-61.
156. The Court found that the police had known for some time of the probable role of
defendant's automobile in the criminal activity. Further, the Court explicitly noted that there
was no indication that defendant meant to flee the jurisdiction. 403 U.S. at 460.
157. For a comparison of the Coolidge decision to other Supreme Court rulings in cases
involving the warrantless search and seizure of an automobile, see 28 RuTGERS L. REv. 766
(1975).
158. The court has defined probable cause in terms of the reasonable belief by the
seizing officer that the contents of the automobile violate the law and in terms of the right to
arrest. State v. Parker, 525 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tenn. 1975). Further, the court generally has
upheld a broad range of fact patterns as providing probable cause. In State v. Parker, 525
S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1975), probable cause for search of an automobile existed based on an
informant's tip as to the location of contraband when the prosecution meets the burden of
showing the reasonableness of: (1) the underlying circumstances from which the informant
drew his conclusions, and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the information was credible, as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Further, in State v. Hughes, Slip op., (Tenn., filed Dec. 6, 1976), the court found that
probable cause for search existed even though defendant's automobile was stopped by officers
when they knew of no violation of the law, but subsequently smelled the odor of marijuana
emanating from inside the automobile. In Miller v. State, 520 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn. 1975), the
supreme court determined that a defendant who disclaims ownership of an automobile prior
to a search may not subsequently contest the legality of the search and seizure of the automo-
bile if ownership is later established.
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rant from a magistrate. "' In Knox v. Fuqua,'6 the court explicitly
focused on the dichotomy between Chambers and Coolidge. In that
case, state agents seized without a warrant the defendant's automo-
bile, which was parked in his driveway, and alleged that the auto-
mobile had been used to transport contraband drugs. "' Although
determining that probable cause existed, the court held that the
seizure violated the search and seizure provisions of both the Ten-
nessee constitution and the fourth amendment. It also noted that
the automobile was parked in defendant's driveway and that there
was no reason to believe that defendant would attempt to flee the
jurisdiction;"12 thus, the exigent circumstances requirement had not
been met. Significantly, the court determined that the Coolidge
decision limited the Chambers holding to its peculiar facts and
reaffirmed the traditional Carroll standard.' Finally, the court rea-
soned that exigent circumstances exist only when the automobile is
"moveable" and "fleeting" so that it can escape the jurisdiction
before a warrant is obtained. "'
Clearly the broad rationale of Chambers has been rejected by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in favor of the Carroll requirement,
which mandates the presence of both probable cause and exigent
circumstances as prerequisites to the warrantless search of an auto-
mobile. The Knox rationale, if consistently applied to subsequent
search and seizure questions, demonstrates a basic respect by the
court for an individual's fourth amendment freedoms and encour-
ages the use of reasonable evidentiary procedures both prior to trial
and during the course of a prosecution.
B. Scope of the Bruton Rule
In Bruton v. United States the United States Supreme Court
proscribed the use in a joint trial of the confession of a codefendant
who does not take the stand when the confession tends to implicate
the nonconfessing defendant.6 5 The Bruton Court concluded that
159. State v. Hughes, Slip op. at 6 (Tenn., filed Dec. 6, 1976).
160. Slip op. (Tenn., filed Oct. 25, 1976).
161. Defendant had made sales of contraband drugs to undercover agents, using his
automobile to transport the contraband. Agents seized the automobile pursuant to the Ten-
nessee Drug Control Act of 1971, TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1443(a)(4) (1975), which mandates
the forfeiture of any automobile used in the transportation of unlawful drugs.
162. The court found that the defendant had been under investigation for 21 days, that
at no time during that period had defendant manifested an intent to leave the jurisdiction,
and that officers had had reasonable time to obtain a warrant.
163. Knox v. Fuqua, Slip op. at 6 (Tenn., filed Oct. 25, 1976).
164. Id.
165. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Under the rules of evidence such a confession is generally
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limiting instructions to the jury could not undo the harm to the
nonconfessing defendant caused by admitting the confession impli-
cating him, and held the admission of the confession into evidence
to be constitutional error. 6' Not all Bruton rule violations require
reversal, however; if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, the conviction can stand."' Additionally, the courts have
carved out exceptions to the Bruton' rule. The rule has been held
inapplicable when a confessing codefendant testifies at trial about
the out-of-court confession, thus subjecting himself to cross exami-
nation. I8 9 The rule also has been held inapplicable when a defendant
implicated by his codefendant's confession also has confessed.' 0
admissible against the confessing codefendant under the traditional admissions exception to
the hearsay rule, but against the nonconfessing defendant it is inadmissible hearsay. See Delli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 240 (1957). Moreover, when the confessing codefendant
does not take the stand, the nonconfessing defendant's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion, which includes the right of cross examination, is violated since the nonconfessing defen-
dant has no means of cross-examining the person who made the accusatory statements. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " See also Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
166. 391 U.S. at 126. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 59, at 136-37 (2d ed. 1972). The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence have attempted
to codify the Bruton rule. Rule 804 deals with exceptions to the hearsay rule when the
declarant is unavailable, such as when he is exempted by the court from testifying on the
ground of privilege. In the section excepting statements against interest from the hearsay rule,
the following sentence is found:
A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a
codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this
exception.
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3).
The corresponding section in the Federal Rules of Evidence does not contain the above
sentence. The House Committee on the Judiciary attempted to add the codification of the
Bruton rule, but the Senate and Conference committees deleted the provision since the
general approach of the Rules of Evidence was to avoid constitutional evidentiary principles.
The Advisory Committee states that "this rule does not purport to deal with questions of the
right of confrontation." FED. RULE Evm. 804(b) (3), Report of House Committee on the Judici-
ary, Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Conference Report, and Advisory Commit-
tee's notes.
167. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
168. See generally Annot., 29 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1971), regarding the application of the rule
and its exceptions.
169. See, e.g., Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (the Constitution as construed in
Bruton is violated only when the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is
unavailable at the trial for cross examination); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d
Cir. 1970).
170. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1971) (when
the defendant's confession interlocks with and supports the confession of the codefendant,
there is no violation of the Bruton rule); United States v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968)
(when the jury has heard not only a codefendant's confession but also the defendant's own
confession no such "devastating" risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be
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The scope of this latter exception confronted the Tennessee
Supreme Court in State v. Elliott."' Elliott and Mitchum were
jointly tried and convicted of murder in the first degree committed
while engaged in a robbery. Both defendants made oral statements,
which were related at trial by a detective, acknowledging their par-
ticipation in the robbery. Elliott admitted that he was the driver of
a getaway car, but he denied being any closer than a mile and a half
from the scene of the robbery, and he denied participating in the
shooting of the victim. Mitchum, who admitted being at the scene
of the crime and shooting the victim, also made statements that
placed Elliott at the murder scene. In determining that the admis-
sion in evidence of Mitchum's statements contradicting Elliott's
confession, when Mitchum did not testify, violated the Bruton rule,
the court set forth the following standards: (1) when jointly tried
codefendants have confessed and the confessions are similar in ma-
terial aspects, there is no violation of the Bruton rule to admit the
confessions into evidence; and (2) when the confession of one non-
testifying codefendant contradicts, repudiates, or adds to material
statements in the confession of the other nontestifying co-
defendant, so as to expose the latter to an increased risk of convic-
tion or to an increase in the degree of the offense with correspond-
ingly greater punishment, the latter defendant is entitled to test the
veracity of the statements in his codefendant's confession. A denial
to him of this right through the failure of his codefendant to take
the stand violates the Bruton rule.1Y2 Although the court found error
when these standards were applied, it held the error to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt since there was overwhelming evidence
of guilt other than the confessions.
In the federal courts the problems presented by the Bruton rule
can be avoided through rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which permits the trial judge to grant a severance of
defendants if joinder is prejudicial to one of the defendants.' The
involved in Bruton); Briggs v. State, 501 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). But see
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969) (holding that it was error to admit a codefendant's confession, although the
defendant had also confessed, since the confessions varied materially).
171. 524 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1975).
172. Id. at 477-78.
173. FED. RuLE CruM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder of offenses
or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together,
the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defen-
dants or provide whatever relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant
for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court
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ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice
give three alternatives when a defendant moves for severance be-
cause the prosecution intends to offer in evidence an out-of-court
statement by his codefendant that tends to implicate him: (1) a
joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence; (2)
a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only
after all references to the moving defendant have been deleted, pro-
vided that, as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the moving
defendant; or (3) severance of the moving defendant.' 74
Tennessee presently has no statute dealing with this precise
issue, 7 5 but case law gives the trial court discretion to sever defen-
dants if a joint trial would be prejudicial to one of the defendants.'76
Although severance eliminates the Bruton problem, and at the same
time allows the state to use the confession against the confessing
codefendant, problems arise when the state attempts to take advan-
tage of a joint trial and the codefendant's confession by deleting all
references to the nonconfessing defendant. In Taylor v. State'7 7 the
Court of Criminal Appeals suggested that a confession properly al-
tered to eliminate all connecting references to the other defendants
might be admissible. White v. State, 7 however, illustrates the diffi-
for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which
the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
The last sentence was added in order to provide a procedure for dealing with the Bruton
problem. See Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts, Advisory Committee's Notes, 34 F.R.D. 411, 419 (1964).
PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, at § 40-1606(b), has a similar provision:
If, upon timely motion to sever, and evidence introduced thereon, it appears to the court
that a joint trial would be prejudicial to any defendant, the court shall order a severance
to the defendant whose joint trial would prejudice the other defendant or defendants.
The Law Revision Commission's Comment to this section states that it "is designed to
prevent prejudice to a defendant by the admission in evidence against a codefendant of a
statement or confession made by that codefendant," and that it "provides a procedure
whereby the issue of possible prejudice can be resolved on the motion for a severance."
174. ABA STANDARDS, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3 (1968).
175. See PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, at § 40-1606(b).
176. See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 489 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Davis v.
State, 445 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). The motion for severance must be made
before the joint trial begins, and the motion must be supported by an affidavit. 489 S.W.2d
at 544.
177. 493 S.W.2d 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
178. 497 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). In this case "the other person" was
substituted for the nonconfessing codefendant's name in twenty-two places. The evidence
showed that the crime in question had been committed by two males, and two males were
being tried jointly. The court stated that to assume that the insertion of "the other person"
cured any possible prejudice would be "a mental gymnastic which is beyond not only their
(the jurors') powers, but anybody elses." Id. at 755. See also The Supreme Court 1967 Term,
82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 231-38 (1968), which expresses the view that deletion would be an
ineffective method for avoiding the Bruton holding. Id. at 237-38.
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culty in avoiding prejudice to the nonconfessing defendant when
this method is used. Moreover, if all references to an accomplice are
deleted, the confession as admitted may become unfairly prejudicial
to the confessing defendant. There may be a few instances in which
alternative (2) of the ABA Standards17 can be met without prejudic-
ing either codefendant, but in most cases it appears that the trial
judge should force the state to elect whether to sever the trials of
the codefendants or to exclude the confession incriminating both
codefendants from a joint trial. 10
C. Cross-Examination of a Defendant Who Takes the Stand
The character of a witness for truthfulness is relevant in deter-
mining the credibility of the witness's testimony.'8' Consequently,
most courts permit an attack upon the witness's character by cross-
examination concerning prior bad acts that have some relationship
to the witness's credibility' and cross-examination as to convic-
tions for certain kinds of crimes.8 3 Courts have taken different views
on the kinds of criminal convictions that can be used for impeach-
ment.18 Some jurisdictions allow the use of any felony or misde-
meanor conviction for impeachment, some specify only felonies, and
others use the common law concept of "infamous crimes."' " A few
courts, rejecting such rules, exclude evidence of convictions if the
prejudicial impact of the evidence exceeds its probative value. 8 ,
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence' and the Model Code of Evidence'88 sought
179. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
180. The "sever or exclude" rule has received substantial support by commentators.
See, e.g., Singer, Admissibility of Confession of Codefendant, 60 J. CRns. L.C. & P.S. 195
(1969); The Supreme Court 1967 Term, supra note 178, at 231-38; 35 Mo. L. Rav. 125 (1970);
47 TEXAs L. Rxv. 143 (1968).
181. McCORMIcK, supra note 166, at § 41.
182. Id. § 42. "Bad acts" include any particular misconduct that would tend to dis-
credit the witness's character even though it has not been the basis for conviction of crime.
Some courts prohibit altogether cross-examination as to acts of misconduct for impeachment
purposes, and other courts permit cross-examination upon acts of misconduct that show bad
moral character, and do not require a close relationship to credibility. Id. There are dangers
of confusion of the issues and unfair surprise to the witness when evidence of prior bad acts
is admitted. See 3A J. WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 979 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970).
183. McCoRMICK, supra note 166, § 43.
184. These views are discussed in McCORMICK, supra note 166, at § 43, and in WIMORa,
supra note 182, at § 980.
185. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2712 (1975) specifies crimes for which a defendant may be
declared infamous, and further provides that the fact of conviction for any of the crimes may
be used only as a reflection upon his credibility as a witness.
186. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
187. UNIFORM RuLE OF EvmENcE 21. After the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted,
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to reform the law by permitting only crimes that involve
"dishonesty or false statements" to be used to impeach a witness's
credibility since evidence of bad character in other respects is of
questionable relevance to the issue of truthfulness and is likely to
be misused."'
In most states, these impeachment rules pose a cruel dilemma
to the criminal defendant with a record who wishes to testify at his
own trial.19 The jury usually will notice the failure of the accused
to testify and infer guilt from silence.'91 If, however, the defendant
decides to testify, the prosecution is entitled to attack his credibility
by cross-examining him as to prior convictions and prior bad acts."'
Despite instructions limiting the jury's consideration of this evi-
dence to the issue of the defendant's credibility as a witness, there
is a danger that the jury will infer either that the defendant proba-
bly committed this crime since he committed the previous crime,
or that the defendant is a bad person and should be incarcerated
regardless of his guilt in this case. 93 To encourage criminal defen-
dants to take the stand, Uniform rule 21 and Model Act Rule 106
provide that a prosecutor may impeach only by a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement, and only if the defendant first pre-
sents evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility.'94
Section 609(a) of the recently codified Federal Rules of Evidence,95
the Uniform Rules were amended to conform for the most part with the Federal Rules.
Therefore Uniform Rules 608(b) and 609 now are substantively the same as Federal Rules
608(b) and 609. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 608(b), 609; note 190 infra and accompanying
text.
188. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
189. Id., Comment.
190. MCCORMICK, supra note 166, § 43; Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the
Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
215 (1968).
191. MCCORMICK, supra note 166, § 43.
192. See notes 184-86 supra and accompanying text for the rules governing this line of
cross-examination.
193. MCCORMICK, supra note 166, § 43; Note, supra note 190, at 215.
194. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21, Commissioner's Note; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 106, Comment.
195. FED. R. Evm. 609(a). This rule as originally proposed was criticized as a regression
from the more logical and just standards embodied in the old Uniform Rules and in the Model
Act. See Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 CRIM. LAW BULL. 330 (1970); Spector,
Impeaching the Defendant by his Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: A Half-Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. CHI. L.J. 247 (1970). It
subsequently was amended, however, to give the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence of
prior felony convictions not involving dishonesty or false statements if the trial judge deter-
mines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) generally bars extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts by a witness for
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however, additionally allows impeachment by crimes punishable by
death or by imprisonment in excess of one year if the probative
value of admitting the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect on
the defendant.
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently recognized the confu-
sion in this area in State v. Morgan'16 and undertook to clarify the
scope of cross-examination of a defendant about prior convictions
and bad acts in order to achieve a higher degree of consistency and
fairness. Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to reverse a convic-
tion of a defendant who had testified in his own behalf and who had
been improperly cross-examined and impeached,'97 the court estab-
lished standards to govern the scope of cross-examination of the
defendant about prior convictions and bad acts, the scope of rebut-
tal in the event of a denial thereof by the defendant, and procedural
rules applicable to such cross-examination. Outlined in simplified
hornbook fashion, the standards are as follows:
I. Evidence of Specific Instances of Conduct of the Defendant.
A. Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the pur-
pose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than
convictions of a crime, may not be proved by extrinsic evi-
dence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
the purpose of attacking his credibility, but does permit, in the court's discretion, specific
instances of conduct to be inquired into on cross-examination if they are probative of truthful-
ness or untruthfulness.
196. Before State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976), the Tennessee rule was that
a conviction for a crime, either a felony or misdemeanor, was admissible to impeach any
witness if it involved moral turpitude. A major problem, however, was that the moral turpi-
tude standard was extremely vague. D. PAINE, TENNESSEE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 202 (1974). In
addition, an ordinary witness could be impeached by cross-examination as to prior bad acts
involving moral turpitude, or indictments. Id. § 206. Whether a testifying criminal defendant
could be asked about prior bad acts and indictments, however, seemed unclear. See id. § 207;
State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1976). If a witness denied a prior conviction,
the record could be produced to rebut him; if a witness denied a prior bad act, however, his
answer was conclusive. PAINE, supra, at §§ 205, 206. Finally, Tennessee law was unclear
whether only recent misconduct or also old sins could be inquired into. Id. § 206. See also
Paine, Character or Reputation of the Criminal Defendant in Tennessee, 34 TENN. L. REv.
351 (1967).
197. After receiving incorrect answers from the defendant on cross-examination about
prior convictions and penitentiary sentences, the prosecuting attorney called a court clerk to
testify that the court records reflected that the defendant had been sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for a conviction of assault to commit voluntary manslaughter twelve years earlier. The
clerk related details of the offense in addition to the fact of conviction and the name of the
crime, and the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that proof of the prior conviction was
admitted solely on the issue of the defendant's credibility as a witness. Additionally, all
arguments about the appropriateness of this cross-examination took place in the presence of
the jury.
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into on cross-examination of the witness concerning his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.1 98
B. When a witness is sought to be cross-examined as to
specific instances of conduct, the court shall conduct a jury-
out hearing for the purpose of determining that the proba-
tive value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial im-
pact.199
C. When such cross-examination is permitted, the answer
of the witness shall be conclusive and the state cannot ad-
duce any evidence to the contrary in rebuttal.2'0
II. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
A. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit-
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of admitting the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment. 21
B. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confine-
ment imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circum-
stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 22
C. The question whether evidence of a particular crime is
admissible shall be determined by the trial judge out of the
presence of the jury.23
D. If the prior crime is in the admissible category, the
inquiry in the presence of the jury shall be limited to the
fact of a former conviction and of what crime. Details of the
prior offense shall not be inquired into or read from the
record.204
198. 541 S.W.2d at 388; see FED. R. Evw. 608(b).
199. 541 S.W.2d at 390.
200. Id.
201, Id. at 388-89; see FED. R. EviD. 609(a).
202. 541 S.W.2d at 389; see FED. R. Evm. 609(b).
203. 541 S.W.2d at 389.
204. Id. at 389, 390.
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E. A witness's negative answer to a proper question in-
volving a prior conviction is not conclusive; the state may
introduce in rebuttal the documentary evidence of the con-
viction, but nothing more."0 5
III. If proof of a specific instance of conduct or of a prior convic-
tion is admitted to impeach a witness's credibility, the trial
judge shall instruct the jury that such proof was admitted solely
on the issue of the defendant's credibility as a witness, and
cannot be considered as to the defendant's guilt or innocence.0 8
The court appears to have succeeded in bringing order to this area
of the law and is to be applauded for adopting the standards of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which appear likely to be the basis for
uniformity in the law of evidence.2 07
VI. IMPROPER PROSECUTORIAL ARGUMENT TO THE JURY
The public prosecutor of a criminal case has responsibilities
different from those of other advocates; his primary responsibility
is not to convict but to seek justice.2 11 Consequently, there must be
limits on the scope of his closing argument to the jury so that its
verdict will be based solely on rational inferences drawn from evi-
dence presented in the trial."9 The ABA has promulgated the follow-
ing standards relating to the prosecutor's summation argument:
(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from
the evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the
jury as to inferences it may draw.210
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express
his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
205. Id. at 390.
206. Id.
207. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVmENCE (1974), Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
208. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsmILrrY EC 7-13.
209. By virtue of his office the prosecutor's argument is likely to have significant influ-
ence on the jury, thus magnifying the necessity that the prosecutor be fair. See Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); ABA STANDARDS REiATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, § 5.8, Commentary (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION].
210. The argument must be confined to the record evidence and the inferences that can
reasonably and fairly be drawn from that evidence. ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 209, § 5.8, Comment a. Still, the prosecutor generally is given great
latitude in drawing inferences. See Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Miscon-
duct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. Rv. 946, 954-56 (1954).
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testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."'
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to in-
flame the passions or prejudices of the jury. 12
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from arguments which would
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence,
by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the
accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of
the consequences of the jury's verdict.1
Other specific prohibitions on the prosecutor's closing argument
include comment on the failure of the defendant to testify at trial214
or to make a statement to an arresting officer," 5 disclosure of the
defendant's character and prior transgressions inadmissible in evi-
dence, 26 suggestions that the prosecutor has unrevealed superior
knowledge of the facts of the case,2 7 or reference to the possibility
of appeal, pardon, or parole if a conviction results.1 8 Since assuming
office, the Tennessee Supreme Court has had four occasions to re-
view alleged misconduct by the prosecuting attorney in his closing
argument to the jury. These cases indicate that the court is con-
cerned with the integrity of the criminal trial and with assuring each
defendant a fair trial by restricting improper prosecutorial argu-
ment.
Smith v. State19 sets forth the approach used by the court in
ruling on prosecutorial misconduct, suggests the applicability in
Tennessee of the harmless error doctrine221 for such cases, states the
211. The problem with this line of argument is that it consists of unsworn, unchecked
testimony and tends to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office. ABA STANDARDS, THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 209, § 5.8, Comment b.
212. Predictions as to the consequences of an acquittal on lawlessness in the community
would divert the jury from deciding the case on the merits. Id. Comment d.
213. Id. § 5.8.
214. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
215. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
216. Note, supra note 210, at 953.
217. Id. at 955.
218. Id. at 956-57.
219. 527 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1975).
220. The harmless error doctrine dictates that a conviction will not be overturned unless
the argument was so prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial. This rule was
recognized implicitly in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), in which the Court in
overturning a conviction stated: "If the case against Berger had been strong, or, as some
courts have said, the evidence of his guilt 'overwhelming,' a different conclusion might be
reached." Id. at 89. See FED. RULE CRim. P. 52(a), which provides that "any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." For a
discussion of harmless error in cases involving improper argument, see Singer, Forensic Mis-
conduct by Federal Prosecutors-and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227 (1968).
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general policy of the law in this area, and illustrates several different
kinds of improper argument. In Smith the defendants had been
convicted of armed robbery and had been sentenced to twenty-five
years. The district attorney general recommended to the jury a sen-
tence of 500 years, indicating that there were reasons for his recom-
mendation that he could not reveal. The court determined that the
jury could have taken this recommendation of a high number of
years to be for the purpose of delaying the date of the defendants'
parole eligibility. Predictions also were made as to the consequences
that a light sentence would have on lawlessness in the community.
The court took a three-step approach in deciding the case. In the
first step of its analysis, after noting the general policy that argu-
ment of counsel is a valuable privilege that should not be unduly
restricted, the court determined that the closing argument of the
district attorney general was improper. Under traditional law, the
indication that the prosecutor was privileged to evidence not avail-
able to the jury, the reference to parole possibilities, and the diver-
sion of the jury's attention from this particular trial to a problem of
crime in general all were improper.2 ' Secondly, the court deter-
mined that the cumulative impact of the improper argument was
prejudicial to the defendant,2" thus apparently recognizing the
harmless error doctrine. Turning to the third step of formulating the
proper relief for the defendants, the court, since it felt that the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming, affirmed the conviction and
attempted to remedy the harmful effects by reducing the punish-
ment to ten years, the minimum sentence for armed robbery."3 This
disposition is commendable because it achieves a balance between
fairness to the defendant and conservation of judicial resources.
In Russell v. State224 petitioner, convicted of second degree mur-
der, had defended on the ground of temporary insanity and had
introduced the testimony of two psychiatrists in support of the de-
fense. The district attorney general in summation attempted to
show the possibilities of abusing psychiatric tests in the event an
221. See notes 210-16 supra and accompanying text. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707 (1975)
requires a trial judge in his charge to the jury to inform them of parole possibilities. Since
this statute did not become effective until after Smith's trial, the court did not consider
whether the statute would allow a prosecutor to use such information in his argument. On
policy grounds it appears that the prosecuting attorney should not be able to use this informa-
tion in arguing to the jury. Whereas the trial judge would be informing the jury in a nonadver-
sarial setting, a prosecutor would attempt in many cases to use the possibility of parole to
induce a larger sentence from the jury.
222. 527 S.W.2d at 739.
223. Id.
224. 532 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1976).
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unscrupulous attorney conspired with an unscrupulous psychia-
trist.2 2 Applying the Smith approach, the court first found the argu-
ment improper because it was not predicated on evidence intro-
duced during the trial and was not pertinent to the issues at trial.
Because the argument attacked the principal defense, the court
found that it had a prejudicial rather than a harmless effect on the
jury. Finally, the court determined that a reversal of the conviction
and a remand for a new trial was the only way to be fair to the
defendant since the issue of temporary insanity would determine
the defendant's criminal responsibility.
The court considered whether a prosecutor's comment on the
failure of the defendants to make a statement at the time of their
arrest2 2 was improper in Braden v. State.22 Although initially such
comment appears clearly improper,228 this case had an additional
ingredient in that the defendants had testified in their own defense
at trial, thus subjecting themselves to impeachment by proof of
prior inconsistent statements. In determining whether the prosecu-
tor's statement was improper, the court held that a balance between
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination and allowing the
defendants' credibility to be tested required that evidence of the
defendants' pretrial silence can be admitted only when that silence
is patently inconsistent with the defendants' testimony. Finding
that the defendants' silence could just as easily indicate that they
relied on their right to remain silent, rather than that their story at
trial was a fabrication, the court held the district attorney general's
argument to be improper. The court found prejudice to the defend-
ants since their credibility was a controlling issue, and reversed the
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
Although the court has been strict in dealing with arguments
based on evidence outside the record and with arguments comment-
ing on the failure of a defendant to make an exculpatory statement
at arrest, it adopted the general view of giving broad latitude to the
drawing of inferences from the record in State v. Beasley.2 1' In
Beasley the pertinent evidence consisted of the victim's identifica-
225. The prosecutor suggested that a psychiatrist might tell the lawyer how his client
should answer the 300 questions on the test in order that his client would appear insane.
226. Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agents were surveilling an area where marijuana
was hidden. The defendant, after inspecting the area and removing a small amount of mari-
juana, was arrested and advised of his constitutional rights. The defendant made no state-
ment, and the prosecutor commented on this failure in his argument to the jury.
227. 534 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1976).
228. See note 215 supra and accompanying text.
229. 536 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1976); see note 210 supra.
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tion of the defendant, a sheriff's testimony that the defendant said
that he had been in Alabama at the time of the crime, and two alibi
witnesses' testimony that the defendant had been in Nashville at
the time of the crime. The court held that it was not error for the
prosecutor to state in his closing argument that the alibi witnesses
gave false testimony since the evidence supported such an inference,
and reinstated the conviction.230 Because the court felt that the
evidence supported the inference, it additionally held that the dis-
trict attorney general did not violate the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility231 by interjecting into the argument his own personal
opinion.
The Beasley case thus raises an issue not often resolved by
courts yet thoroughly discussed by commentators:232 How can mis-
conduct in the prosecution of a criminal case be prevented? Fairness
to the defendant, the issue addressed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Smith, Russell, Braden, and Beasley, is but one aspect of
prosecutorial misconduct for which the appropriate remedy is often
appellate reversal. The other aspect of such misconduct is the pun-
ishment of the prosecutor to deter future misconduct. Although it
is rarely used, commentators almost uniformly believe that punish-
ment for contempt of court may be the ideal remedy for prosecu-
torial misconduct. 33 This sanction is administered easily and is flex-
ible enough to be used no matter how trivial or how egregious the
misconduct may be. The efficacy of such a sanction obviously would
depend upon its vigorous use by the trial court.234 The catalyst to
encourage such vigorous use, however, may well be consistent scru-
tiny by the appellate courts of the integrity of the trial process. 235
230. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the
district attorney general's argument was improper. 536 S.W.2d at 329.
231. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "in appearing in his profes-
sional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not . . . assert his personal opinion. . . as
to the credibility of a witness . . . ; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for
any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein." ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106(c)(4).
232. See, e.g., Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TExAs L. REv. 629 (1972); Cain, Sensational Prosecutions and Reversals, 7 NOTRE DAME LAw.
1 (1931); Singer, supra note 220; Note, supra note 210; Note, Prosecutor Forensic Miscon-
duct-"Harmless Error"?, 6 UTAH L. REv. 108 (1958).
233. See Alschuler, supra note 232, at 673-74; Singer, supra note 220, at 276; Note,
supra note 210, at 981-82.
234. For views that the duty of correcting this problem of prosecutorial misconduct lies
primarily in the trial judge, see Cain, supra note 232, at 21; Note, 6 UTAH L. Rlv., supra note
232, at 113.
235. For a discussion of the importance of the appellate court's role, see Alschuler,
supra note 232, at 675.
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As well as encouraging trial judges to force the prosecutors to stay
within legal and ethical bounds, such scrutiny also might act as a
direct deterrent on the prosecutors themselves. 26 In this series of
cases it appears that the Tennessee Supreme Court is calling on trial
judges and prosecuting attorneys to conduct their trials in a manner
calculated to achieve a just result. If such cases involving prosecu-
torial misconduct persist, however, the court might achieve its de-
sired result by a strong admonishment in addition to taking what-
ever action is appropriate to ensure fairness to the defendant.
VII. CHARGE TO THE JURY
A. Criminal Responsibility
During the past century Tennessee courts applied a strict inter-
pretation of the traditional M'Naghten standard for criminal re-
sponsibility, concluding that a defendant may not be excused from
criminal responsibility unless it can be established that at the time
of the crime he lacked sufficient capacity and reason to distinguish
between right and wrong.2 In recent years, however, substantial
criticism has been leveled at the M'Naghten "right from wrong" test
because it fails to consider the relative responsibility of those per-
sons accused of crime who suffer from serious mental disorders. 21 It
has been argued that a defendant might realize that an act is wrong,
but be unable to conform his actions to the standard of conduct
recognized as "right" because of mental disease. 29 Moreover, critics
have noted that the concept of "right and wrong" is essentially an
236. Id. at 646-47. The argument is that the prosecutor has the burden of retrial; his
superiors will be aware of his misconduct, and a judicial rebuke may be personally and
professionally embarrassing.
237. The M'Naghten rule originally was adopted as the Tennessee criminal responsibil-
ity standard in Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1872). See also McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442,
242 S.W. 883 (1922); Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W. 168 (1915); Bond v. State,
129 Tenn. 75, 165 S.W. 229 (1914).
238. As originally formulated the M'Naghten rule contained two essential tests: (1)
knowledge of the nature and quality of an act, and (2) knowledge of the wrongfulness of an
act. As the rule developed, however, the first requirement of the M'Naghten standard disap-
peared, presumably under the theory that if an accused did not know the nature and quality
of an act, then he could not know that it was wrongful.
The majority of jurisdictions and commentators finding fault with the M'Naghten rule
have directed severe criticism at the narrow "right or wrong" test. See generally Hill v. State,
252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429 (1969); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d
556 (1967); State v. Noble, 142 Mont. 284, 384 P.2d 504 (1963); Terry v. Commonwealth, 371
S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963). See also Snouffer, The Myth of M'Naghten, 50 ORE. L. REv. 41 (1970).
239. See Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of Criminal
Responsibility, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 911, 913-20 (1975). See generally Gerber, Is the Insanity
Test Insane?, 20 Am. J. Ju. 111, 116-22 (1975).
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ethical concept that improperly forces the factfinder to make moral
judgments. 20
In Graham v. State,24' the present supreme court significantly
changed the Tennessee test for criminal responsibility. Following
the lead of a number of state courts242 and all but one of the federal
circuits, 43 the court rejected the previously applied M'Naghten
test, 44 and examined possible alternative standards by which to
determine criminal responsibility. Initially, the court explored the
application of the irresistible impulse test, which focuses on a deter-
mination of whether the mental condition of an accused is such as
to deprive him of the necessary willpower to resist the impulse to
commit a crime, regardless of the defendant's perception of "right
and wrong. 2145 The court further considered the "product rule" for-
mulated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Durham v. United
States.2 11 Under the Durham standard, an accused is relieved from
criminal responsibility if his act is "the product of mental disease
or defect."'2  The intent behind the Durham formulation is to allow
240. See 11 Hous. L. REv. 946, 950-51 (1974).
241. Slip op. (Tenn., filed Jan. 31, 1977).
242. At least seventeen other state jurisdictions have adopted the Model Penal Code
as the standard for defining criminal responsibility. They include: Alaska, Connecticut,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
Ohio, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and District of Columbia. See Slip op. at
20 (Tenn., filed Jan. 31, 1977).
243. All federal circuits with the exception of the first have adopted the Model Penal
Code provision. Slip op. at 20 (Tenn., filed Jan. 31, 1977).
244. The M'Naghten rule is the oldest of the tests of criminal responsibility currently
in use. It originally was articulated in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), and pro-
vided:
[Tio establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury. . . has generally
been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right
and wrong. ...
Id. at 722; see 58 IowA L. REv. 699, 700 (1973).
245. The viability of the "irresistible impulse test" first gained prominence in Parsons
v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887). In those jurisdictions employing the irresistible impulse
test, it and the M'Naghten standard are both applied so that the factfinder may absolve the
accused of criminal responsibility if it finds he did not know the difference between "right
and wrong," or if it finds that the defendant lacked the freedom of will to choose "right." 58
IOWA L. REv. 699, 701 (1973).
246. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Although the District of Columbia originally pro-
posed the "product rule," it subsequently abandoned the standard. See United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
247. 214 F.2d at 875. The Durham court further elaborated on the application of the
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the introduction of expert medical testimony within the context of
a legal rule. 28 Durham expressly recognizes, however, that the de-
termination of mental disease or defect rests solely within the prov-
ince of the factfinder and cannot be controlled by clinical testimony
offered in support or derogation of mental impairment. 24'
Rejecting both the irresistible impulse test and the "product
rule" as alternative standards to the M'Naghten test, the present
court adopted the express language of the ALI Model Penal Code
provision, which states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include any abnormality manifested by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.ns
The ALI Model Penal Code provision promotes the introduction of
useful expert testimony on both the volitional and cognitive capaci-
ties of an accused, thereby more precisely presenting the issue of
criminal responsibility to the factfinder.25 Moreover, the ALI provi-
sion allows the meaningful consideration of clinical testimony by a
jury. The M'Naghten rule and the irresistible impulse test presup-
pose a complete impairment of the cognitive capacity or of the
capacity for self-control, therefore largely undermining the majority
of clinical examinations, which reveal gradations of impairment
We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either
improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not
capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or the
result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease.
Id.
248. 214 F.2d at 875-76. For a discussion of the "product rule," see Wechsler, The
Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 367 (1955); 8 Naw ENG. L. REv. 328
(1973).
249. 214 F.2d at 876. Durham provides:
Juries will continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental
precept that "Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot
impose blame." But in making such judgments, they will be guided by wider horizons
of knowledge concerning mental life. The question will be simply whether the accused
acted because of a mental disorder, and not whether he displayed particular symptoms
which medical science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even typically, accom-
pany even the most serious mental disorder.
Id.
250. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962). See also Slip op. at 24. (Tenn., filed Jan. 31,
1977). The Tennessee Supreme Court replaced the ALI suggested language in part (1),
"criminality of the act," with the words "wrongfulness of the act."
251. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01, Appendix B (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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rather than the complete inability of an accused to distinguish
"right and wrong" or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.252 The Durham product rule appeared to the proponents of
the Model Penal Code to lack the clarity needed to aid a jury in
making a determination of criminal responsibility.253 The ALI provi-
sion, therefore, expressly requires that the defendant's lack of ca-
pacity be "substantial" rather than complete, thus enabling experts
to testify about an accused's mental condition in probabalistic
terms rather than in certainties.24 The intent of this formulation is
to allow the jury to employ its "sense of justice. ' '255
To implement the requirements of the ALI provision, the su-
preme court expressly approved the charge directed to jurors formu-
lated by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Smith,5 which states:
The question for jury consideration pertaining to criminal responsibility when
defendant offers an insanity defense are as follows:
1. Was he suffering from a mental illness at the time of the commission
of the crime?
2. Was that illness such as to prevent his knowing the wrongfulness of
his act?
3. Was the mental illness such as to render him substantially incapable
of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with
violating? "' 1
Moreover, the Smith court enunciated that a negative finding in
response to the first question, or in response to both the second and
third questions, would require rejection of the insanity defense,
while an affirmative finding to the initial question, plus an affirma-
tive finding to either the second or third questions, would require a
252. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
253. Id., Comment 5. The Comment specifically states:
The difficulty with this formulation inheres in the ambiguity of "product." If inter-
preted to lead to irresponsibility unless the defendant would have engaged in the crimi-
nal conduct even if he had not suffered from the disease or defect, it is too broad: an
answer that he would have done so can be given very rarely . . . .If interpreted to call
for a standard of causality less relaxed than but-for cause, there are but two alternatives
to be considered: (1) a mode of causality involving total incapacity or (2) a mode of
causality which involves substantial incapacity. . . . But if either of these causal con-
cepts is intended, the formulation ought to set it forth.
Id.
254. 58 IowA L. REv. 699, 704 (1973). See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01, Comment 4 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Allen, The Role of the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 494, 497-98 (1962).
255. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
256. 404 F.2d 720 (1968).
257. Id. at 727; see Slip op. at 25 (Tenn., filed Jan. 31, 1977). The Graham opinion also
commends the changes enunciated in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1008 (D.C. Cir.
1972), and Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963), but refuses to adopt
their express language. See Slip op. at 25 (Tenn., filed Jan. 31, 1977).
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jury verdict of "not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibil-
ity. 258
With the adoption of the American Law Institute standards, a
Tennessee jury can evaluate effectively the presence or lack of voli-
tional capacity and the capacity of self-control, without resorting to
the insufficient "right from wrong" determination previously em-
ployed. Moreover, the ALl position ensures the reliable use of
expert testimony as a key component in any determination of crimi-
nal responsibility and allows a jury to measure the individual as-
pects of clinical evidence without posing the burdens of an "all or
nothing" approach. In adopting the Model Penal Code rule, the
present court has indicated an awareness of the need to update
criminal procedure techniques to meet the advantages that modern
scientific and clinical analysis can provide, as well as a responsibil-
ity to ensure that the factfinder possesses a clear and reasonable
understanding of the requisite elements of criminal responsibility.
B. The Allen Charge
In Allen v. United States,259 the Supreme Court approved an
instruction for trial courts confronted with a deadlocked jury. The
Allen charge instructs the jury to deliberate further and encourages
minority jurors to consider whether their decision is reasonable com-
pared with that of the majority.2 0 While cautioning that the verdict
must reflect the decision of each individual juror and not mere
acquiescence in the conclusions of the majority, the Allen charge
requires each juror to examine the question with candor and with
proper regard and deference to the opinions of the majority.2 1 Sub-
258. 404 F.2d at 727.
259. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). For a discussion of the impact of the Allen charge, see Note,
The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 296
(1972); Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968).
260. 164 U.S. at 501. The relevant portion of the Allen charge is set forth below:
• .. although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each
other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that
they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that,
if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand,
the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might
not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the
majority . . ..
Id.
261. Id. For a discussion criticizing the specific use of this phrase, see 34 TUL. L. REv.
214 (1959).
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sequent to Allen, an overwhelming majority of federal and state
jurisdictions adopted with modification the standard proposed by
the Supreme Court.62
Focusing on the language that admonishes minority jurors to
evaluate their findings with deference to the conclusions of the ma-
jority, commentators and the judiciary recently have criticized the
charge as coercive and improper because it directs reevaluation only
of the minority point of view.2 3 It is claimed that this interjects the
prestige of the court on behalf of the majority and thereby creates
a risk that individual determinations will be changed in favor of a
consensus opinion." 4 Criticism also has focused on the time at which
an Allen instruction is given. Generally, the vast majority of courts
have found the deadlock charge to be less coercive when adminis-
tered with other general instructions prior to initial jury delibera-
tions.6 5 Since the instruction typically is not given until after a jury
reports to the court that it is unable to reach a verdict, this criticism
appears well founded.2 6 Further arguments against the use of the
Allen instruction have centered on both the lack of uniform guid-
ance under the Allen decision as well as the administrative burden
posed by appellate review of the charge. Allen critics have noted
that despite frequent urgings from higher courts to remain within
the limits set by the original instruction, trial judges continue to
revise and vary the basic elements of the charge."' Although the
overwhelming number of jurisdictions require that the instruction
admonish each juror that his decision must be an individual deter-
mination, the wording of the overall charge is significantly unregu-
lated. This lack of clarity and uniformity burdens appellate courts
that must resolve the application of disparate Allen charges. 66
In response to criticism of the Allen instruction, the American
Bar Association promulgated a series of standards that establish
262. Comment, The Faltering Allen Charge and Its Proposed Replacement, 16 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 619 (1972).
263. See Comment, Instructing the Deadlock Jury: Some Practical Considerations, 8
J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 169, 183 (1974); Comment, Instructing Deadlocked Juries: The
Present Status of the Allen Charge, 3 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 313 (1972); 8 WILLAMETTE L.J. 468
(1972).
264. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, § 5.4(b), Comment 2 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, JURY TRIAL].
265. 36 TENN. L. REv. 749, 757 (1969). For a discussion of the constitutional implications
of this aspect of the Allen charge, see Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung
Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 136-44 (1967).
266. 36 TENN. L. REV. 749, 757 (1969).
267. ABA STANDARDS, JURY TRIAL, supra note 264, § 5.4(b), Comments.
268. Id.
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guidelines for instructing a deadlocked jury. 69 Rather than urging
minority jurors to reconsider their decision with a deference to the
majority position, the ABA proposal abandons all reference to the
majority-minority divisions" ' and instructs each juror to consider
the evidence impartially and change his decision only if he deter-
mines on reexamination that it was in error. "' To prevent coerced
verdicts and hasty discharges,"' the standards forbid the court to
threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable time,7 '
and allow the judge to dismiss the jury if there is no reasonable
probability of agreement. 4
Because of the Supreme Court's continued affirmation of the
Allen decision, circuit courts have been unable to make significant
changes in the charge or to develop a uniform approach to the dead-
lock instruction. 5 The Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits27s have required deletion of the minority-majority deference
provision as a coercive and improper instruction and have embraced
269. ABA STANDARDS, JURY TRIAL, supra note 264, § 5.4. The specific ABA provisions
are set out below:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which
informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with
a view to reaching an agreement if it can be done without violence to individual judg-
ment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impar-
tial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine
his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may
require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as
provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears
that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
Id.
270. See 25 VAND. L. REv. 246 (1972).
271. ABA STANDARDS, JURY TRIAL, supra note 264, at § 5.4(a)(iv).
272. Id. at §§ 5.4(b), 5.4(c), Comments.
273. Id. at § 5.4(b).
274. Id. at § 5.4(c).
275. For a discussion of the federal approach, see 6 MEM. STATE U.L. REv. 553, 557-58
(1976).
276. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fiora-
vanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411
F.2d 930 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1969).
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the guidelines drafted by the ABA.27 The First,18 Second, 279
Eighth,2sa and Ninths ' Circuits continue to use a modified Allen
charge, but have indicated an awareness of the coercive dangers of
the charge. Only the Fourth, 28 2 Fifth,'2  Sixth,'84 and Tenth 21 Cir-
cuits refuse to limit substantially the employment of the Allen in-
struction although they have noted the value of the ABA Jury Trial
Standards.
Tennessee courts traditionally adhered to a modified version of
the Allen charge originally enunciated in Simmons v. State.2s In
Kersey v. State, '2  however, the present supreme court abandoned
the Allen formulation, 2 8 ruling that the Simmons charge operated
to impose a judicially mandated majority verdict that violated the
constitutional right of trial by juxy.29 Although recognizing that a
trial judge has a legitimate role in the guidance of a jury, the court
determined that forcing a juror to surrender his views violates the
jury's constitutional province and unconscionably dilutes the unan-
277. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1182-86 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States
v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1969); United States
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). The Third Circuit,
although not expressly approving the ABA standards, did adopt virtually identical language
by suggesting the employment of the charge recommended in MATTHEWS & DEvrrr, FEDERAL
JURY PRACrICE AND INSTRUCTION § 79.81 (1965). See also 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 619 (1972).
278. The First Circuit recognized the serious questions posed by the Allen charge in
United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971). To mitigate the possibilities of
prejudice, the court advised trial judges to balance a supplementary charge so that (1) the
onus of re-examination would not be on the minority alone, (2) a jury would not feel com-
pelled to reach agreement, and (3) that jurors would be reminded of the burden of proof. Id.
at 883. See also United States v. Anguilo, 485 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1973) (reaffirming Flannery).
279. United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965). But see United States v.
Stewart, 513 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1975) (modified Allen charge expressly upheld).
280. Chicago & E.I. Ry. v. Sellars, 5 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1925) (refused to allow recitation
of second paragraph in Allen).
281. Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1967); see United States v. Con-
treras, 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972) (when jury returns a verdict quickly subsequent to an
Allen charge, there is strong indication that it is coercive).
282. See United States v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1973). For recognition of ABA
standards, see id. at 429.
283. Bryan v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bailey, 468
F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972). For recognition of ABA standards, see 468 F.2d at 667. See also Green
v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962).
284. United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1968).
285. Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971).
286. 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955). The Simmons charge included the require-
ment that the minority should listen to the views of the majority with the disposition of being
convinced. 281 S.W.2d at 4.
287. 525 S.W.2d 139 (1975).
288. See notes 260-61 supra.
289. 525 S.W.2d at 144.
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imity achieved.29 To replace the Simmons instruction, the court
adopted the guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Associa-
tion 29' and enunciated the express language under which state trial
judges are to charge a deadlocked jury.292 In conformity with the
ABA proposal, the adopted instruction repeatedly reminds each
juror that his decision must be made individually and that honest
convictions should not be relinquished solely because of the major-
ity viewpoint or in an attempt to reach a consensus verdict.2 3 Fur-
ther, no trial judge is allowed to depart from the express language
mandated by the Kersey opinion. The instruction cannot be altered
even if the judge initially included the charge in the general instruc-
tions given the jury prior to its original deliberations. 294
The present court has taken a significant step toward ensuring
a defendant the right to receive a verdict determined only by the
individual decision of each juror. The Kersey opinion proffers a
charge that withstands the criticisms of the former Allen-type in-
struction. The Kersey formulation eliminates any minority-
majority distinction provision and repeatedly states the importance
of individual decision-making. Moreover, by expressly requiring the
Kersey charge to be used by all trial judges, the supreme court
effectively eliminates the possibilities of lower court deviation in-
herent in any general guideline and provides uniform criteria for
state appellate review. By requiring the instruction to be given with
a court's general charges to the jury, the court has limited the coer-
cive effect of a charge initially spoken only after a jury reports that
it is unable to attain a verdict.
VIII. SENTENCING
A. Non-Lawyer Criminal Judges
The employment by the vast majority of state jurisdictions of
290. Id.
291. Id.; see note 269 supra.
292. The court expressly announced:
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view
to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each
of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration
of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate
to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But
do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely
because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict.
525 S.W.2d at 145.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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lay judges in criminal proceedings in which an accused faces possi-
ble incarceration has been the target of extensive constitutional
examination. 2 5 Three specific allegations generally are proffered in
support of due process challenges to the nonattorney criminal judi-
ciary. The foremost objection is that the increased complexity of
criminal law requires the presence of a legally trained judge who
understands the constitutional issues inherent in any proceeding
that subjects an accused to the possibility of confinement. 26 Accord-
ingly, the California Supreme Court, in Gordon v. Justice Court of
Yuba City,"7 determined that the use of lay judges in criminal pro-
ceedings in which a defendant may be subjected to confinement
violates due process. 298 The Gordon court found that nonattorney
judges were either unaware of or unable to grasp a number of signifi-
cant constitutional issues present in many criminal misdemeanor
cases, so that the use of such judges substantially increases the
likelihood that a criminal defendant will not receive a fair trial. 299
A second argument is that a nonattorney judge is more apt to
be swayed by his own personal prejudices, as well as by local pres-
sure, 300 because nonattorney judges lack the required knowledge of
the legal and constitutional issues involved in criminal proceed-
ings." ' Moreover, because a nonattorney judge is not well versed in
the legal issues involved in criminal due process, critics of the lay
judge system charge that such a judge is highly susceptible to advice
from law enforcement officers.302 This argument assumes that a
judge seeking independent legal advice will contact the lawyer with
whom he is most familiar, and in many cases this will be someone
associated with the prosecutor or police.313 Obviously such a proce-
295. Current statistics reveal that forty-three of the fifty state jurisdictions and the
District of Columbia employ lay judges to some extent. Note, Limiting Judicial Incompe-
tence: The Due Process Right to Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal
Proceedings, 61 VA. L. REv. 1454, 1461-62 (1975). See also North v. Russell, 96 S. Ct. 2709,
2712 n.4 (1976).
296. See North v. Russell, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976); Brief of Amicus Curiae Tennessee
Council of Juvenile Judges at 5, State v. Williams, Slip op. (Tenn., filed Nov. 29, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Williams Briefl.
297. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974).
298. For a discussion of Gordon, see 5 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 437 (1975); 6 N.C. CENT. L.J.
339 (1975).
299. 525 P.2d at 76. The court focused its attention directly on procedural problems,
evidentiary matters, and jury instructions. Id.
300. See Note, The Right to a Legally Trained Judge: Gordon v. Justice Court, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 739 (1975).
301. Id.
302. Note, supra note 295, at 1468.
303. Id.
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dure, combining the accusatory and the adjudicatory functions, vio-
lates both due process and the notion of trial judge impartiality."'
On the other hand, proponents of the lay judge system argue
that the use of nonattorney judges relieves the state of a significant
financial and administrative burden. It is felt that a judicial system
composed only of legally trained judges would require a large in-
crease in judicial salaries and also would disadvantage rural coun-
ties in which there are relatively few lawyers. 35 Finally, advocates
of the nonattorney system contend that a de novo appeal structure
corrects any due process defects arising under lay judge determina-
tion. 0
The United States Supreme Court has recently confronted
challenges to the use of lay judges in state criminal proceedings. In
North v. Russell,3 7 the defendant contested the constitutionality of
a police court ruling by a lay judge that found the defendant guilty
of driving while intoxicated and that subjected him to possible im-
prisonment. 08 Alleging that the right to counsel articulated in
Argersinger v. Hamlin3 ' and Gideon v. Wainwright3 ° is meaningless
without a legally trained judge to understand the arguments of
counsel, the defendant asserted that due process requires the pres-
ence of such a judge at any criminal proceeding in which an accused
faces the possibility of confinement. Focusing directly on Kentucky
procedure, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in permitting
a nonattorney judge to sentence a defendant to imprisonment since
Kentucky law provided for de novo appeal in all such cases."I Limit-
ing its holding strictly to the situation in which de novo appeal is
available, the Court held that the mere presence of a nonattorney
judge does not violate due process.
Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Williams,
12
confronted a constitutional challenge to the use of lay judges in the
state juvenile court structure. The defense alleged that the due
304. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
(1968). See also 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 339 (1975).
305. These issues were reached in Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 79 (1974). See
also Williams Brief, supra note 296, at 191.
306. Note, supra note 295, at 1472.
307. 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976).
308. The particular statute involved provided that a first offense conviction carried a
fine of from $100 to $500, while a subsequent offense carried the same fine as well as imprison-
ment for not more than six months. 96 S. Ct. at 2710.
309. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
310. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
311. 96 S. Ct. at 2712.
312. Slip op. (Tenn., filed Nov. 29, 1976).
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process clause of both the federal and state '13 constitutions requires
the use of an attorney judge, because a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice exists when lay judges preside over juvenile proceedings
involving the possibility of incarceration. The court in Williams,
however, refused to address the charge, dismissing the appeal after
finding the bills of exception to be defective." 4 The constitutional
challenges to the lay judicial structure in Tennessee, which the
present supreme court refused to resolve in Williams, are certain to
reappear. ' s Present Tennessee law requires that all state court
judges be authorized to practice law in the state, with an exception
provided for the majority of general sessions judges.3 16 This excep-
tion allows nonattorney justices to preside over misdemeanor and
traffic violation proceedings, as well as state juvenile proceedings.
In each of these circumstances the defendant has an absolute right
to a de novo appeal. Although the United States Supreme Court's
holding in North v. Russell arguably would preclude due process
challenges to a two-tier court system in which a lay judge makes the
initial determination, followed by an appeal of right and a de novo
appearance before an attorney judge, the present state supreme
court specifically found that the North decision does not affect an
examination of the due process issue under the state constitution. ','
The court thus retained the nonattorney due process question for
future determination.
B. Recidivist Statutes
(1) Habitual Criminal Statutes
Tennessee's habitual criminal statute318 defines a habitual crimi-
nal as one who has been convicted of three felonies, two of which
were for specified serious offenses.319 If such a defendant is charged
313. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
314. The court noted Ithat the bills of exception were not signed by the trial judge nor
filed within the statutory time limit. Further, the court found that the technical record in
the case did not state whether the judge involved was an attorney. Slip op. at 3-5 (Tenn.,
filed Nov. 29, 1976).
315. The Williams court specifically states that this matter is of vital public importance
and that the time is opportune for resolution. See Slip op. at 2 (Tenn., filed Nov. 29, 1976).
316. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-119 (Supp. 1976). See also TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
317. Slip op. at 2 n.1 (Tenn., filed Nov. 29, 1976).
318. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801 to -2806 (1975).
319. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1975). The specified serious offenses include assault
with intent to commit murder, assault with intent to commit rape, mayhem, malicious
shooting or stabbing, abduction of a female from parents or guardian, "infamous crimes" as
defined in TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2712 (1975), violation of the controlled substances law, or
any crime punishable by death. See generally Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing
Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1157-61 (1960).
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with a specified fourth felony, he also may be charged as a habitual
criminal and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for
parole for thirty years .32  The United States Supreme Court has
determined that conviction as a habitual criminal is not an indepen-
dent crime or an additional penalty for earlier crimes, but is a status
that entitles the state to punish the defendant more severely. 32' As
with multiple offender statutes,32 the justification for the harsher
sentence is the necessity of confinement to protect society from
further criminal conduct by the defendant.
2 3
Although some habitual criminal statutes have been criticized
for relying solely on the number of convictions rather than the na-
ture of the crimes committed,324 the Tennessee statute has escaped
such criticism. By requiring three convictions for specified serious
crimes, the Tennessee statute reflects the policy adopted by the
Model Sentencing Act,3 25 the Model Penal Code, 326 and the ABA
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
32 1
320. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2802, -2803, -2805, -2806 (1975). Section 40-3613 provides
that an habitual criminal may become eligible for parole after serving thirty years in the
penitentiary.
321. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 628 (1948);
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
322. See Multiple Offender Statutes infra.
323. See Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976); ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.4(b)(iv) (1968); PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, § 39-
845, Comment; Thomsen, Sentencing the Dangerous Offender, 32 FED. PROB. 3 (1968).
324. See Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 99
(1971); Note, Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas-The Second Felony Offender in New York,
45 FORDHAM L. REv. 76 (1976).
325. The Model Sentencing Act is devoid of a provision similar to a traditional habitual
criminal statute. Rather, reflecting its general theme of sentencing according to the character
of the offender rather than the particular offense, MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 1 & Comment,
the Model Sentencing Act provides that an extended sentence is appropriate only if incarcera-
tion is required for the protection of the public because of the dangerousness of the defendant.
MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 5. The Act provides three categories of dangerous offenders: (1)
commission of a crime that inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm, and propen-
sity to commit crime; (2) commission of a crime that, intended or not, seriously endangered
the life or safety of another; previous criminal conviction; and propensity to commit crime;
(3) participation in organized crime. Id., Comment.
326. The Model Penal Code contemplates a two-tiered sentencing system with longer
sentences justified for certain categories of offenders. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 6.07, 7.03
(1962); see Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habit-
ual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HAav. L. REv. 56 (1975). One such category, the persistent
offender, is one who is over twenty-one years of age and who has previously been convicted
of two felonies or of one felony and two misdemeanors, committed at different times when
he was over the age of majority. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 (1962). All categories allude to
the defendant's dangerousness. These include a professional criminal, a dangerous, mentally
abnormal person, and a multiple offender, all as defined in the Code. Id. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3575
(Supp. 1976) (increased sentences for dangerous special offenders).
327. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.3
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that only those defendants posing a genuine threat to society should
be subject to a more severe sentence.32 8 Under the Tennessee statute
a dangerous defendant is not subject to the harsher sentence until
he has committed four crimes-three of which are enumerated in
the statute as serious.
In two respects, however, the Tennessee statute is subject to
serious criticism. 29 The first is the mandatory life sentence imposed
when a habitual criminal is convicted for a fourth serious felony; the
second is the denial of parole eligibility until the offender has served
a minimum sentence of thirty years. 3 1 In contrast, the Model Sent-
encing Act, 331 the Model Penal Code, 332 and the ABA Standards on
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures3 33 all give the sentencing
court flexibility in the use of extended sentencing provisions. The
discretion is allowed so that the judge may give individualized con-
sideration to each defendant. Additionally, none of these proposals
allows life imprisonment solely because the defendant is adjudged
to deserve an extended sentence. 34 The drafters of these proposals
determined that a twenty or thirty year sentence, if necessary,
would be ample to protect society and at the same time make the
offender psychologically susceptible to treatment other than the
passage of time.35 Finally, these acts all allow any individual, in-
cluding one committed as a habitual offender or the equivalent, to
be eligible for parole. 36 Tennessee's requirement that a habitual
(1968). The habitual criminal section of these standards requires a finding by the court that
an additional sentence is necessary to protect the public. Cf. PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra
note 77, § 39-842 (also requiring a prediction of dangerousness before habitual offender status
is justified).
328. The purpose of this policy is to prevent the nuisance offender, rather than the truly
dangerous offender, from being subject to the often harsh consequences of such legislation.
See Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 99 (1971), which
argues that in operation most habitual offender laws "limit the liberty of a group of offenders
characterized neither by violence nor dangerousness as much as by inadequacy."
329. See Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Plight of the Habitual Criminal,
26 TENN. L. REV. 259 (1959).
330. See note 320 supra.
331. MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 5, Comment.
332. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.07, 7.03 (1962) ("... may be sentenced to an extended
term . . ."; "The court may sentence . . . to an extended term. ... ).
333. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.3(b).
334. The maximum under MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 5 is thirty years, under MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6.07(2) is twenty years, and under ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDURES § 3.3(a)(ii) is twenty-five years.
335. See MODEL SENTENCING Acr § 5, Comment; Rubin, The Model Sentencing Act, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 251 (1964).
336. The MODEL SENTENCING ACr § 13 allows parole at any time within the discretion
of the parole board; no minimum term served as a prerequisite to parole is allowed. The
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06, 6.07, on the other hand, require all felons sentenced to the
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offender serve thirty years before becoming eligible for parole,
though effective in fulfilling the policy goal of protecting the com-
munity, appears to eliminate any rehabilitative benefits the correc-
tional system may have to offer. The Tennessee statute ignores the
fact that a parole board with discretion to grant parole after a rea-
sonable time to a habitual criminal, though perhaps with special
standards, can adequately protect society and at the same time give
a rehabilitated offender a chance to contribute to society when it is
safe for him to do so. 337
The Tennessee Supreme Court's only decision involving the
habitual criminal statute deals with the double jeopardy problem.
In Pearson v. State3 ' the court attempted to clarify the law with
respect to the appropriateness of using the same felony convictions
to establish successive convictions under the habitual criminal stat-
ute . 39 Since a defendant's status as a habitual criminal is consid-
ered a status entitling the state to punish the defendant more se-
verely for a subsequent crime, rather than an independent crime (or
additional penalty for an earlier crime), the court, following what
it considered to be the majority view, held that the second use of
prior convictions to support a habitual criminal charge in addition
to the latest felony conviction does not violate the proscription
against double jeopardy. In light of the overwhelming authority
upholding the constitutionality of habitual criminal statutes based
penitentiary to serve a minimum of one year before being eligible for parole; only in the case
of an extended sentence for a first-degree felony is this absolute minimum increased (to five
years), with discretion in the court to fix the minimum term up to ten years. For a second-
degree felony, extended term, the minimum can be fixed from one to five years. The ABA
STANDARDS § 3.2 do not require a minimum sentence before parole eligibility, but do give the
sentencing judge discretion to impose a minimum sentence. Only in the case of a life sentence
would a minimum sentence as long as ten years be allowed.
337. See Thomsen, Sentencing the Dangerous Offender, 32 FED. PROB. 3 (1968).
338. 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1976).
339. The petitioner's record was as follows:
a. Sept. 16, 1964-armed robbery
b. Sept. 16, 1964-burglary
c. Dec. 2, 1964-armed robbery
d. April 26, 1973-armed robbery
e. April 26, 1973-habitual criminal
f. August 2, 1973-armed robbery
g. August 2, 1973-habitual criminal
The September 16, 1964, armed robbery and burglary convictions, the December 2, 1964,
armed robbery conviction, and the April 26, 1973, armed robbery conviction resulted in the
April 26, 1973, habitual criminal conviction. Petitioner argued that the second use of these
convictions, in addition to the August 2, 1973, armed robbery conviction, to sustain the
second habitual criminal conviction violated the constitutional proscriptions against double
jeopardy, U.S. CONST. Amend. V; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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on the "status" rather than "independent crime" nature of such a
conviction, the court's opinion appears to be a reasonable applica-
tion of the statute.3 40
(2) The Multiple Offender Statute
In contrast to habitual offender laws, which are triggered by a
third or fourth conviction and authorize or require the sentencing
court to impose more severe penalties on recidivists than on first
offenders, multiple offender laws come into play when a defendant
is convicted of two or more crimes before a sentence is imposed. In
such cases the court typically must decide whether the individual
sentence will run consecutively or concurrently. In Gray v. State3 11
the Tennessee Supreme Court established standards for trial courts
to use when determining whether defendants convicted of multiple
offenses should be given consecutive sentences.32 Stating that the
objective is to use consecutive sentencing in order to protect society
from those who resort to criminal activity in furtherance of an anti-
societal lifestyle, the court held that a trial court should impose
consecutive sentences only after finding that confinement for such
a term is necessary to protect the public from further criminal con-
duct by the defendant.3 43 The court identified the kinds of offenders
for which consecutive sentencing may be used as follows: (1) the
persistent offender, one who has previously been convicted of two
felonies or of one felony and two misdemeanors committed at differ-
ent times when he was over eighteen years of age; (2) the profes-
sional criminal, one who has knowingly devoted himself to criminal
acts as a major source of livelihood or who has substantial income
or resources not shown to be derived from a source other than crimi-
nal activity; (3) the multiple offender, one whose record of criminal
340. As the court noted:
We see no reason why a first conviction under the habitual criminal law which increases
the penalty for the felony conviction with which it is associated should be treated as
wiping the slate clean and permitting the defendant to start over again as though he had
never been convicted of any felony. Where the very purpose of the habitual criminal act
is to penalize the repetition of criminal conduct, we find nothing unfair, much less
unconstitutional, in using the same criminal conviction as the basis for the increased
punishment for a subsequent felony conviction.
521 S.W.2d at 228 (quoting State v. Losieau, 182 Neb. 367, 154 N.W.2d 762 (1967)).
341. 538 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976), reaff'd, Adams v. State, Slip op. (Tenn. Feb. 28,
1977).
342. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1975) gives the trial court the discretion to impose
either concurrent or consecutive sentences.
343. The court here adopted verbatim the policy expressed in ABA STANDARDS, SENT-
ENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.4(b)(iv) (1968).
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activity is extensive; (4) the dangerous mentally abnormal person,
one so declared by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a
result of a presentence investigation that the defendant's criminal
conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive or compul-
sive behavior or by persistent aggressive behavior with heedless in-
difference to consequences; 4 and (5) the dangerous offender, one
whose conduct indicates that he has little or no regard for human
life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk
to human life is great.345 To ensure adherence to these standards and
to facilitate review, the court instructed trial judges to include in
the record considerations leading to the imposition of consecutive
sentences.
346
With this decision Tennessee is now very much in line with
modem thinking regarding consecutive sentences for multiple offen-
ses. The Tennessee Code, section 40-2711, as do the Model Sentenc-
ing Act, the Model Penal Code, 347 and the ABA Standards, 345 makes
the decision whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
one within the trial court's discretion, and the imposition of a con-
secutive sentence appears to require the affirmative action of the
trial court. More importantly, and consistent with the policy under-
lying the Model Sentencing Act, the Model Penal Code, and the
ABA Standards, the consecutive sentence is to be imposed only if,
due to the defendant's dangerous character and conduct, a lengthier
period of detention is needed in order to protect society. 345 Though
344. The concepts of persistent offender, professional criminal, multiple offender, and
mentally abnormal person were adopted from the MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 (1962), which
sets forth the criteria for a court to use in determining whether to impose an extended term
of imprisonment. See text accompanying notes 325-27 supra.
345. The court also refused to require the trial judge to consider whether all the offenses
arose out of one single criminal episode in determining whether the sentences must run
concurrently, thus rejecting one aspect of MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 22, and PROPOSED TENN.
CODE, supra note 77, §§ 39-301, 39-845(c). In so doing the court appears to agree with ABA
STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.4, Comment c (1968), that the
term "single criminal episode" is too ambiguous to provide a guideline for the occasions when
a consecutive sentence should be prohibited; furthermore, the court stated that the concept
of a "single criminal episode" is irrelevant in determining how best to protect the interests
of society.
346. The court emphasized that the decision to impose consecutive sentences when
crimes inherently dangerous are involved should be based upon the presence of aggravating
circumstances and not merely on the fact that two or more dangerous crimes were committed.
347. MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 22; MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.06 (1962).
348. ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.4(a) (1968).
349. See MODEL SENTENCING ACT §§ 1, 5, 22; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.03, 7.06 (1962);
ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.4(b)(iv) (1968). In addition,
PROPOSED TENN. CODE, supra note 77, § 39-845(b) & comment, would require the sentencing
judge to consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character,
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the mechanics and limitations of the Tennessee system and the
proposed acts and standards all differ, the policy of looking at the
individual defendant and the needs of society in determining
whether an extended sentence is necessary is worthwhile, and the
court is to be commended for adopting standards to implement this
policy.
C. Capital Punishment
A series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the
summer of 1976110 stimulated a renewed public interest in the capi-
tal punishment controversy and led to the first execution in this
country in almost a decade. 5' The constitutional status of capital
punishment had been in doubt since the 1972 decision of Furman
v. Georgia,35 in which the Court held that a death penalty imposed
in an arbitrary or capricious manner violates the eighth amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. After Furman,
thirty-five states adopted new death penalty statutes353 in an at-
tempt to meet constitutional requirements. Some of these statutes
made the death penalty mandatory under certain circumstances,
and others put strict limitations on the sentencing body's discretion
in the hope of avoiding arbitrariness.54 In 1976, however, the Court
ruled that the eighth amendment requires consideration of the char-
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether consecutive sentences are
necessary for the protection of society.
350. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
351. Before 1977 the last execution in the United States took place on June 2, 1967, in
Colorado. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1773, 1773 n.1 (1970). Commentators discussing sentencing systems have
disagreed, as has the population generally, on the appropriateness of a death penalty for
certain crimes. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) provides for capital punishment under
specified conditions. The Model Sentencing Act, on the other hand, in keeping with its
philosophy that a diagnostic and treatment approach should be taken for all offenders, does
not provide for the death penalty. Finally, the ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PROCEDURES § 1.1 (1968) states that "this report does not deal with whether the death penalty
should be an available sentencing alternative .... "
352. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The decision, limited to the application of the death penalty
in the three cases before the court, was announced in a per curiam opinion. Five justices
concurred in and four dissented from the result, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall
concluding that the eighth amendment prohibits capital punishment for all crimes and under
all circumstances. See The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 76-85 (1972).
353. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
354. Many of the statutes limiting the sentencing body's discretion were modelled after
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962). Under that provision the sentencing body would be
required to find that at least one specified aggravating circumstance existed and that no
specified mitigating circumstance existed before the death penalty could be imposed.
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acter and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the
particular offense before the death penalty is inflicted.' 5 Although
determining that the imposition of a mandatory death penalty is
unconstitutional, the Court held that the death penalty per se does
not violate the eighth amendment. 5 Thus a statute that guides and
limits the discretion of the sentencing body to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action can pass constitutional mus-
ter under the eighth amendment and Furman v. Georgia.
In Collins v. State35' the Tennessee Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the Tennessee death penalty.35 Under the
Tennessee statutes enacted in 1974, the death penalty was manda-
tory for all persons convicted of murder in the first degree or as
accessories before the fact of that crime. After reviewing Furman v.
Georgia35 and subsequent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions,60 the Tennessee Supreme Court declared Tennessee's manda-
tory death penalty statute unconstitutional and set aside the sent-
ences in the cases under consideration. The court further stated that
the effect of its holding was to revive prior law regarding sentences
for first degree murder, thereby allowing punishment from twenty
years to life imprisonment.36'
Subsequently, the Tennessee legislature has passed a new capi-
tal punishment bill362 modeled after statutes upheld by the United
355. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct.
3001 (1976).
356. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
357. Slip op. (Tenn. Jan. 24, 1977).
358. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2405 to -2406 (1975).
359. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
360. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976). See text accompanying notes 355-56 supra.
361. The court remanded the cases to the trial courts for a sentencing hearing. Justice
Henry concurred with the holding that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional, but
dissented from the disposition of the cases. Since each defendant had a full trial by jury
resulting in a first degree murder conviction with no mitigating circumstances, Justice Henry
felt the court had the authority to reduce the sentences to life imprisonment in order to
conserve judicial resources.
362. Tenn. S. 82; H.R. 59. The caption of this bill indicates its most salient features:
An Act. . . providing for and defining the crime of murder in the first degree; providing
for a punishment including the death penalty or life imprisonment under certain circum-
stances; specifying certain procedures to be followed by the judge and jury for the
imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment after conviction for murder in the
first degree including separate sentencing procedures; making certain requirements for
unanimous findings in reaching determination of a death sentence; specifying statutory
aggravating circumstances; allowing consideration of mitigating circumstances; provid-
ing appellate review procedures . . ..
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States Supreme Court."'3 Although the court could follow the lead
of the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson"8 4 and de-
clare capital punishment violative of the state constitutional provi-
sion prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment,8 5 the reasoning of
Collins v. State suggests that the court will uphold the proposed
statute since the Collins court appeared content to apply federal
standards to the Tennessee statute without independent analysis of
the "cruelty" and "unusualness" of capital punishment in modern
society.
D. Harsher Sentences on Retrial
When a conviction is set aside after direct or collateral attack
by the defendant, the government may retry the defendant without
violating the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
under the theory that the original conviction has been wholly nulli-
fied and the slate wiped clean.3" And though there is no absolute
constitutional bar to the imposition of a harsher sentence upon re-
conviction, 37 the United States Supreme Court recently recognized
that due process requires that vindictiveness against a defendant
who successfully attacks his first conviction can play no part in the
sentence he receives after a new trial. 8 To protect a defendant from
363. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2534.1 to -2537
(Supp. 1976); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
364. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). Even though the death
penalty statute recently had been enacted by the California legislature, the court heeded its
judicial responsibility to interpret the standards by which the constitution should be applied.
365. It should be noted that the California Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual
punishment, whereas the Tennessee Constitution, as does the United States Constitution,
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6 with TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 16. Nevertheless, the California court found the death penalty to be both cruel and
unusual. Thus People v. Anderson may be considered persuasive in analyzing the Tennessee
Constitution.
366. 493 P.2d at 888; see The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 50, 83 (1972).
367. U.S. v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). The guarantee against double jeopardy is found
in U.S. CONST. amend. V.
368. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
15 (1919). ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE § 3.8 (1968) and ABA
STANDARDS, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES (1968) require, as a matter of policy, that the original
sentence be made the ceiling for any sentence that is imposed after reconviction. The ABA
gives three reasons for this proposal: (1) the only class of persons whose sentences may be
increased consists of those who have exercised the right to challenge their convictions; (2) the
risk of a harsher sentence as the result of assertion of the right of review may act as a deterrent
to the exercise of the right; (3) allowing harsher sentences may require inquiry into the
motivations of the sentencing judge in order to insure that the sentence was not imposed to
deter others from asserting their right of review, an inquiry that the ABA committee felt to
be undesirable as a matter of policy. See also Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965), arguing that
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retaliation by the sentencing judge, the United States Supreme
Court in North Carolina v. Pearce369 established that when a judge
imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial the reasons for the
harsher sentence must affirmatively appear on the record, and the
reasons must be based upon objective information concerning iden-
tifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding. 30
Some states, such as Tennessee, entrust the sentencing func-
tion to the jury rather than to the judge.37' Reasoning that jury
sentencing does not contain an inherent threat of vindictiveness, the
Supreme Court in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe312 held that due process
does not require extension of Pearce restrictions to jury sentencing
so long as the jury is not informed of the prior sentence. The Court
suggested, however, that Pearce might be applied if the jury was
informed of the prior sentence because of the highly publicized na-
ture of the prior trial.3 3
In Sommerville v. State3 14 the Tennessee Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue left open by Pearce and Chaffin: whether the
Pearce standards are applicable to harsher sentences imposed by a
jury having knowledge of a sentence by a prior jury. In Sommerville
nine of the twelve jurors at the second trial had read a newspaper
report that the defendant's first sentence was for a maximum of
twenty years; in actuality the maximum had been set at fifteen
years. The second jury imposed a sentence having a maximum term
harsher sentences on retrial are unconstitutional, a position that the Supreme Court has
refused to adopt.
369. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
370. Id. at 726.
371. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707. The prevailing view today is that the trial judge and
not the jury should exercise the sentencing function. See ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 1.1 (1968); MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 12. If juries are allowed to
determine the sentence, there often will be disparity between sentences under similar circum-
stances since a jury in one case would have no feel for what has been done in similar cases.
372. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). The court pointed out several differences between jury and
judge sentencing that would negate the threat of vindictiveness. In Chaffin the jurors had no
knowledge of the prior sentence, unlike a trial judge who would know the history of the case.
Also since they had no personal stake in the prior conviction, there would be no motivation
for self-vindication. Finally, a jury would have no institutional motivation to impose a higher
sentence to discourage appeal as a judge might.
For arguments supporting the extension of the Pearce standards to jury sentencing, see
Aplin, Sentencing Increases on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427
(1970); Note, The Aftermath of North Carolina v. Pearce: A Harsher Sentence on Retrial?, 7
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 108 (1972). See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 38 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
373. 412 U.S. at 28 n.14 (1973).
374. 521 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. 1975).
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of twenty-one years. Agreeing with the Chaffin holding, the court
stated that jury sentencing, absent knowledge of the prior sentence,
is not susceptible to the retaliatory motivations that prompted the
Pearce limitations. Since the instant jury had knowledge of the prior
sentence, however, the court concluded that there was a possibility
of vindictiveness underlying the longer sentence and characterized
the sentence as "tainted with the implication of vindictiveness. ' '3 7
Having found knowledge of the previous sentence and possible vind-
ictiveness, the court remanded the case to the trial court with in-
structions to enter judgment pronouncing the same sentence im-
posed by the first jury or, in the discretion of the trial judge, to grant
a new trial. 7
Although the court held that a harsher sentence meted out by
a second jury with knowledge of the sentence imposed by the first
jury is tainted with the implication of vindictiveness condemned by
Pearce as being violative of the due process clause, the court did not
hold the Pearce standards applicable under such circumstances.
Rather, the court held that a juror with knowledge of the verdict and
sentence of a prior jury shall be subject to challenge for cause, unless
the examination unequivocally demonstrates that he is impartial.37
Since failure to challenge for cause or to use available peremptory
challenges if a challenge for cause is denied precludes reliance upon
the juror's disqualification on appeal, the court apparently believed
that the problem of a harsher sentence by a jury having knowledge
of a prior sentence could be eliminated at the early stage of the
second trial.378 Still, there remains the possibility that during trial
the jury will be informed that there was a prior trial and conviction.
For example, when a witness's testimony at a previous trial is intro-
duced to impeach him or to refresh his memory at the second trial,
this testimony informs the jury of a prior trial and could give rise
to an inference of vindictiveness if the jury imposes a harsher sent-
ence. If a defendant is reconvicted by a jury that has obtained such
knowledge during the course of the second trial, the sentence should
375. Id. at 797.
376. The statutory authority for this disposition is TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (1975).
377. 521 S.W.2d at 797. The court further held that whenever there is believed to be a
significant possibility that a juror has knowledge of the jury verdict at a prior trial, the
examination of that juror with respect to his exposure must take place outside the presence
of the other chosen and prospective jurors.
378. Since the court in Sommerville was confronted with the combination of state
action in the form of court appointed counsel for the defendant and an error of constitutional
dimension, it did not invoke the waiver rule because of defendant's failure to challenge for
cause and use available peremptory challenges.
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be limited to that imposed in the original trial, a result consistent
with the reasoning of Sommerville v. State.79
IX. EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS
The Tennessee Supreme Court twice80 has considered and up-
held the constitutionality of the recently enacted "expungement"
statute.38 ' This statute allows a person who has not been indicted
or convicted, or one whose conviction was reversed on appeal, to
petition the court to have the public records concerning that inci-
dent removed and destroyed.382 In Martin v. State313 the statute was
attacked on the ground that it violated Article III, Section 17 of the
Constitution of Tennessee 384 by impliedly amending the statutory
duties of court clerks"5 without reciting in its caption or body the
title or substance of the law amended. Although recognizing that
the expungement act by implication amended a portion of existing
statutory law prescribing the duties of clerks, the court reaffirmed
the well-established doctrine in Tennessee that Article II, Section
17 does not apply to repeals or amendments by implication.3 6 The
379. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 41 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Note, The Aftermath of North Carolina v. Pearce: A Harsher Sentence or Retrial?, 7 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 108 (1972).
380. Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. 1975); Martin v. State, 519 S.W.2d 793
(Tenn. 1975). In Skiles v. State, 516 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1974), the trial court held the expunge-
ment statute unconstitutional, but the supreme court ruled that the constitutionality of the
statute should not have been addressed since the statute was not applicable. In Skiles the
defendant plead guilty to reduced charges; he was not acquitted.
381. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-4001 to -4004 (1975), as amended § 40-4001 (Supp. 1976).
382. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-4001 was amended in 1975 to eliminate the requirement that
the cost of expungement be borne by the petitioner. Section 40-4002 requires the chief admin-
istrative officer of the governmental unit and the clerk of the court where the records are
recorded to remove and destroy the records within 60 days of the disposition of the charge; §
40-4003 provides for retroactivity; and § 40-4004 provides penalties for violations of the act.
The present statute has been attacked recently because the accused has to petition the
court in order for his records to be expunged. The critics argue that the records should be
expunged automatically in order that indigent defendants may be able to benefit from its
provisions without having to hire an attorney to prepare a petition. See The Tennesseean,
Mar. 23, 1977, at 35.
383. 519 S.W.2d 793 (Tenn. 1975).
384. TENN. CONsT. art. II, § 17 provides in pertinent part:
All acts which repeal, revise or amend formers [sic] laws, shall recite in their caption,
or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revised or amended.
385. The statutory duties of court clerks are found in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 18-105, -402
(1955 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
386. 519 S.W.2d at 795-96 (citing Brown v. Knox County, 187 Tenn. 8, 212 S.W.2d 673
(1948)). In addition, the court found no merit in the argument that expungement might
prevent a defendant from relying on the double jeopardy clause. A defendant must only
obtain a certified copy of the document reflecting the favorable disposition to ensure this
protection.
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court reaffirmed Martin in Underwood v. State387 and also consid-
ered whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague or violates the
separation of powers provisions of the Tennessee Constitution.3 8
Noting that making and keeping court records requires the coopera-
tion of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches, the court
determined that the expungement statute, which does not frustrate
or interfere with the judicial function, does not constitute an imper-
missible encroachment upon the judiciary.389 The court additionally
found that the language of the statute was sufficiently clear to pre-
vent its invalidation for being vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.
This litigation raises questions concerning the costs and bene-
fits of the expungement statute. On the one hand, the retention of
arrest records of a person who is not convicted may be useful in
effective law enforcement. If that person is arrested again in the
future, his personal data would already be on file. Such data might
help the victim of another crime identify the perpetrator. Further-
more, accurate arrest records are needed in compiling statistical
profiles when changes of laws or procedures are being considered. 310
On the other hand, an arrest, even though it does not lead to a
conviction, often results in irreparable injury to the person arrested.
Job opportunities may be lost,31 business or professional licenses
may be denied,392 police may consider the previously arrested person
a suspect in subsequent crimes, and judges may rely on a prior
arrest in denying pretrial release or imposing sentences.3 9 3 Although
387. 529 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. 1975).
388. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 1 divides the powers of government into three branches,
and § 2 prohibits a person belonging to one branch from exercising the powers properly
belonging to another.
389. Since the power to establish guidelines for court clerks and records is within the
legislative function, the court felt that control of the use of such records is also a legislative
function.
390. See generally Comment, Branded, Arrest Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss.
L.J. 928 (1973); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
391. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in
stating that there is little doubt that arrest records are a barrier to employment, cites to a
survey indicating that 75% of employment agencies contacted in New York City would not
recommend an individual with an arrest record, regardless of the disposition of the charges
against him. NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIIMNAL JvSTCE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL STRATEGY].
See generally Comment, Employment of Criminal-Record-Victims in Missouri: Restrictions
and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. Rv. 349 (1976).
392. See Hess & Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction,
13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 497 (1967).
393. See Comment, 21 N.Y.L.F. 85 (1975). The commentary to ABA STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRORATION § 2.3 (1970) suggests that an arrest not resulting in a
conviction shall not be included in a pre-sentence report since such information often is
extremely misleading.
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the criminal justice system is based on a presumption of inno-
cence,394 the failure of many segments of society to distinguish an
arrest and subsequent acquittal from a conviction has necessitated
laws such as the Tennessee expungement statute. Although techni-
cal violations may be the sole reason for the erasure of all records,
it is necessary to preserve the rights of the truly innocent. 95 The
Tennessee legislature has made this determination, and the su-
preme court appears willing to support its judgment.
X. CONCLUSION
Three developments have combined to establish Tennessee
criminal procedure in its present state. First, the United States
Supreme Court, in a series of landmark decisions, has formulated
substantial protections for those accused of crimes and has modern-
ized both trial and sentencing procedures. Secondly, the drafters of
various uniform acts and standards, building on these decisions,
have attempted to rationalize and systematize procedures for the
arrest, trial, and punishment of criminal defendants. Finally, the
Tennessee Supreme Court, elected in 1974 with a mandate to mod-
ernize Tennessee law, has responded to the opportunity to reform
state criminal procedure presented by the prior developments. Par-
ticularly in the areas of right to counsel, scope of discovery, admiss-
ability of evidence, jury instructions, and expungement of records
the court is to be commended for its careful analysis of recent trends
and its willingness to break new ground in an attempt to formulate
well-defined rules under which criminal allegations can be ad-
judged.
JULIAN L. BIBB
WALTER SILLERS WEEMS
394. For a discussion of the failure of the presumption of innocence in the arrest-record
context, see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, § 8.3, Commentary (1973); Hess & Le Poole, supra note 392, at 502
(1967).
395. Some commentators advocate the further step of enacting statutes that prohibit
employers from inquiring about purged criminal records or that prohibit discrimination
against persons with criminal records. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 391, at 57; Note,
Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L.Q. 306 (1970); cf. A.B.A. STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO PROBATION § 4.3 (1970); Kogan & Laughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CaIM. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970).
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